MICHELMORE -v- BROWN [No 3] [2025] WASC 9

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION : MICHELMORE -v- BROWN [No 3] [2025] WASC 9

CORAM : TOTTLE J

HEARD : 19 DECEMBER 2024

DELIVERED : 15 JANUARY 2025

FILE NO/S : CIV 2457 of 2023

BETWEEN : LAURA JANE MICHELMORE
Plaintiff

    AND

    ADAM SYDNEY BROWN
    First Defendant

    JERALD MARTIN
    EMMA HAZEL MARTIN
    Second Defendants

    EMERSION PTY LTD as trustee for THE MARTIN TRUST 
    Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Defamation – Imputations about the integrity and professional competence of legal practitioner – No defences – Judgment for damages including aggravated damages – Injunction granted to restrain further publication of defamatory imputations – Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Defamation Act 2005 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)

Result:

Judgment for the plaintiff

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : Mr J O’Hara
First Defendant : No appearance
Second Defendants : No appearance
Third Defendant : No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : In Person
First Defendant : In Person
Second Defendants : In Person
Third Defendant : No appearance


Cases referred to in decision:

Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd [2009] NSWCA 9
Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 366
Brown v Stewart [2022] WASC 399
Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44
Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] UKHL 3; [1972] AC 1027
Cerutti v Crestside Pty Ltd [2014] QCA 33; [2016] 1 Qd R 89
Costello & Abbott v Random House Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 137 ACTR 1
Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41 NSWLR 176
Firmware Technologies Group Inc v Asia Platinum Group Ltd [2016] WASCA 179
Google LLC v Defteros [2022] HCA 27
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v O’Shane (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 291
Lazos v West Australian Newspapers Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 238
Michelmore v Brown [2024] WASC 277
Michelmore v Brown [No 2] [2024] WASC 456
Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No 9] [2017] WASC 367
Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497
Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118

TOTTLE J:
Introduction
1 The plaintiff is a legal practitioner who sues for damages for defamation. The defendants are former clients of the plaintiff. The action arises from the publication of two emails containing statements impugning the plaintiff’s integrity and professional competence. One email was published by the first defendant and one email was published by all the defendants. The statements were grossly defamatory of the plaintiff. They had no foundation in fact. They were wholly indefensible and should never have been made.
2 The plaintiff’s claim against the first defendant concerns statements in an email addressed to the Governor of Western Australia, the Chief Justice of this court, the Attorney‑General of Western Australia and the Commissioner of Police of Western Australia. The first defendant sent the email on 28 June 2023 and sent copies to the first named second defendant, Mr Martin, to a third party who had expressed interest in retaining the plaintiff’s services (‘Mr J’) and to the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia.
3 The plaintiff’s claim against all three defendants concerns statements in an email sent by the second defendants on behalf of the third defendant on 31 July 2023 to the email address of the Central Office of this court and to the plaintiff. The first defendant was involved in the preparation of the email. The email was copied to the email addresses of Government House, the Attorney‑General and the chambers of the Chief Justice of this court. The email was also sent to the email addresses of the associates of all but one of the then current judges of the Supreme Court, to the email address of the associate of a judge of the court who had recently retired and to the associates of the registrars of the court. In addition, the email was sent to the email addresses of the Magistrates Court, the Legal Practice Board, the Commissioner of Police, an employee of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, a member of the State Parliament and two members of the Commonwealth Parliament.
Procedural matters
4 The first defendant and the second defendants represented themselves. The third defendant was represented by a solicitor between 20 February and 24 May 2024 but has otherwise been unrepresented.
5 On 5 August 2024 I ordered that judgment be entered against the first defendant for damages to be assessed if the first defendant did not file and serve a defence by 30 August 2024, and I delivered written reasons for that decision. The first defendant did not file and serve a defence by 30 August 2024 or, indeed, at all. As at the date of the trial the plaintiff had not taken the step of formally entering judgment in accordance with the order of 5 August 2024 as she was entitled to do. The assessment of damages to be awarded against the first defendant and the trial of the claims against all defendants were listed to be heard together.
6 Neither the first defendant nor the second defendants attended the trial. Not only had they given no indication that they did not intend to attend but in the days before the trial was due to commence the second defendants filed material on which they wished to rely at trial.
7 The materials the first defendant attempted to rely on in these proceedings and the arguments he raised at directions hearings reflected his adherence to bizarre conspiracy theories. These are referred to in more detail later in these reasons. Viewed objectively, the scandalous nature of the allegations made by the first defendant against the plaintiff and others was calculated to distress the plaintiff and dissuade her from pursuing her claim.
8 The second defendants filed and served documents that, allowing appropriate latitude to them as litigants‑in‑person, constituted defences in that they addressed each of the paragraphs in the statement of claim and commented on them. The second defendants’ substantive defence was that the statements about the plaintiff in their 31 July 2023 email were true. They argued the plaintiff’s claim for defamation must be viewed in the context of their complaints against the plaintiff – they characterised themselves as ‘the original injured party’. In response to a direction made on 14 September 2024 the second defendants filed and served a document on 12 October 2024 in which they set out matters they claimed substantiated the allegations contained in the 31 July 2023 email. On 14 October 2024 I ordered the second defendants’ justification defence be limited to two of the matters alleged in the 12 October 2024 document. I refer to these two matters later in these reasons.
9 In a 74‑page document filed and served on 18 December 2024 (the day before the trial commenced) the second defendants’ adopted a more nuanced position in relation to the statements about the plaintiff contained in the 31 July 2023 email. They argued that in the email they had not stated the plaintiff was guilty of the allegations made against her rather the email had ‘requested investigation [of the plaintiff] by legal authorities’. In the 18 December 2024 document the second defendants argued other defences were open to them. I refer to those other defences later in these reasons.
10 On 28 August 2024 I made a limited asset freezing order against the second defendants the effect of which was to restrain the second defendants from disposing of $150,000 that represented a proportion of the net proceeds of sale of their home.
11 As this litigation has proceeded the second defendants have raised concerns about the conduct of the plaintiff, her counsel and the court. They have complained about the stressful nature of the litigation process. In addition, they maintain they have been treated unjustly and deprived of procedural fairness. One of the second defendants’ complaints is that they have not been permitted to bring a counterclaim against the plaintiff. Their unsuccessful application for leave to commence a counterclaim is the subject of reasons delivered by me on 3 December 2024.
12 In the context of the second defendants’ complaints about a lack of procedural fairness it must be emphasised that despite being given the opportunity to do so they have consistently failed to identify a factual or legal basis for their self-characterisation as ‘the original injured party’. This may be due in part to the difficulties encountered by the second defendants as litigants‑in‑person but it is primarily due to the absence of any foundation in fact for the proposition that the plaintiff injured the second defendants let alone in the manner and to the extent to which the second defendants assert. The absence of any factual or legal foundation for their claims provides an explanation for the second defendants seeking refuge in various pseudo law concepts (exemplified by their references to themselves as ‘executors and beneficiaries’) of the nature frequently invoked by those described as ‘sovereign citizens’. Unsurprisingly, these included the proposition that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
13 At trial the plaintiff was given leave to amend her amended statement of claim. The amendments did not widen the factual matrix or alter the substance of the plaintiff’s case. Other than in the manner which I will now describe, the amendments were largely textual in nature correcting typographical errors. The two amendments of potentially more significance were, first, that the imputations the plaintiff alleged were conveyed by the 31 July 2023 email were recast to eliminate repetition that was present in the earlier version of the statement of claim and to add an additional and less serious imputation. This imputation was pleaded in paragraph 29.3 and is incorporated in that part of the pleading reproduced later in these reasons at [115]. The second amendment of potentially more significance was the addition of a schedule of aggravating conduct relied on by the plaintiff (the plaintiff’s statement of claim had always included a claim for aggravated damages). With limited exception the aggravating conduct comprised conduct engaged in by the defendants in the course of this action.
The evidence
14 The plaintiff gave evidence in support of her own case. The plaintiff’s evidence‑in‑chief comprised a witness statement signed by her that attached a bundle of documents. Without being exhaustive the documents comprised correspondence, primarily email correspondence exchanged between her and the defendants, documents generated for the purposes of the matters on which she was retained, file notes and internal accounting information generated for her legal practice. The plaintiff’s evidence was supplemented by oral evidence‑in‑chief. In addition to the documents referred to in her witness statement the plaintiff tendered a supplementary trial bundle primarily comprising the transcript of two hearings in the Magistrates Court proceedings brought by her against the first defendant for the recovery of fees. Further, the plaintiff tendered a bundle of documents in support of her claim for aggravated damages. This bundle comprised court documents the defendants had filed or attempted to file and emails sent by them.
15 The plaintiff’s evidence‑in‑chief was cogent and consistent with the contemporaneous documents. I accept it.
16 Ms Morag Smith, a friend of the plaintiff and, who like the plaintiff, is a legal practitioner, also gave evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim. Ms Smith’s evidence‑in‑chief comprised her witness statement. Ms Smith’s evidence‑in‑chief was primarily directed to the effect on the plaintiff of the publication of the 31 July 2023 email. Ms Smith’s evidence was also cogent and coherent and I accept it.
17 The following account of the facts is derived largely from the plaintiff’s evidence and the contemporaneous documents.
The facts
18 The plaintiff was admitted as a lawyer in 2004. Since May 2017 she has practised as a sole practitioner under her own name ‘L J Michelmore’. Her main practice area is litigation. The plaintiff has established a good professional reputation. It is a testament to that reputation that other members of the profession are the main source of referred work.
19 In May 2021 the plaintiff was introduced to the second defendants. They wished to retain her to act on behalf of the third defendant. The third defendant, in its capacity as the trustee of the Martin Trust, carried on a business known as ‘Emersion Flotation Spa Skin and Body Clinic’. In their capacity as directors of the third defendant, the second defendants required legal advice in relation to two matters concerning the third defendant’s business.
20 The first matter concerned a potential claim for damages for loss of business caused by roadworks undertaken adjacent to the third defendant’s premises on Albany Highway, Kelmscott. The roadworks were part of the Metronet project and I will refer to this claim as the Metronet claim. On 27 May 2021 the plaintiff sent the second defendants her standard litigation retainer.
21 Under the heading ‘Parties’ the retainer described ‘the law practice’ as ‘L J Michelmore’ and nominated the third defendant as the client.
22 The Metronet claim led to proceedings being commenced in this court by the third defendant against the Public Transport Authority of Western Australia and Downer EDI Works Pty Ltd (CIV 2301 of 2022).
23 The second matter on which the second defendants sought the plaintiff’s assistance on behalf of the third defendant concerned a dispute over a lease of premises in the Precinct Complex, Mount Pleasant. On 3 June 2021 the plaintiff sent a further litigation retainer to the second defendants in relation to the lease dispute. Like the first retainer agreement, this retainer nominated the third defendant as the client.
24 The second defendants signed both litigation retainers on behalf of the third defendant and returned them to the plaintiff.
25 On 14 July 2021 the plaintiff had a face‑to‑face meeting with Mr Andrew Roberts, a potential witness in relation to the lease dispute. The plaintiff prepared a draft proof of evidence for Mr Roberts. On 27 July 2021 Mr Martin informed the plaintiff that he had spoken to Mr Roberts on the telephone and that Mr Roberts had ‘hung up on him’. The plaintiff’s evidence was to the effect that in the light of that event it was decided not to do any further work on Mr Roberts’ draft proof of evidence.
26 On 2 August 2021 the plaintiff sent the second defendants an itemised account addressed to the third defendant that included charges for the time she had spent meeting with Mr Roberts and preparing a draft proof of evidence. The second defendants did not raise any concerns with the plaintiff about her work on the preparation of Mr Roberts’ draft proof or about her invoice generally. I infer that the invoice was paid.
27 In October 2021 Mr Martin asked the plaintiff whether he could pass her name onto a friend of his. The plaintiff agreed. The friend was the first defendant and he wanted advice in relation to a potential claim arising out of his purchase of a car at auction. The prospective defendant was Manheim Pty Ltd, a company that had acted on instructions from the Public Trustee, that had in turn acted on behalf of a deceased estate.
28 The plaintiff prepared a retainer agreement with the first defendant in respect of the potential claim against Manheim Pty Ltd. As will become apparent the first defendant became fixated on the plaintiff’s use of the words ‘Rossello Chambers’ which appeared on the title page of the retainer agreement as shown below:
Image
29 In the body of the retainer agreement under the heading ‘Parties’ ‘L J Michelmore’ was nominated as ‘the Law Practice’ and ‘Adam Brown’ as ‘the Client’. The scope of the work to be undertaken pursuant to the retainer was the preparation and filing of an application for pre‑action discovery against Manheim Pty Ltd. The words ‘Rossello Chambers’ did not appear other than on the title page of the retainer agreement. The words ‘Rossello Chambers’ did not appear on the plaintiff’s letterhead but they did appear under the plaintiff’s name on the signature block in her emails.
30 The plaintiff made an application for pre‑action discovery on the first defendant’s behalf. The application was heard by Master Sanderson on 13 September 2022. The first defendant told the plaintiff he was happy with how the hearing before the Master had gone.
31 On 28 October 2022 the first defendant engaged the plaintiff to provide advice and assistance in relation to an application made by the first defendant in the State Administrative Tribunal.
32 On 23 November 2022 Master Sanderson published reasons dismissing the first defendant’s application for pre‑action discovery. The plaintiff offered to obtain an opinion from a barrister on the prospects of an appeal. The first defendant told the plaintiff he had already received advice from a barrister to the effect that the Master’s decision could not be successfully appealed. The first defendant told the plaintiff not to worry about an appeal and that he was ‘a grown‑up [he] had made a choice’ and that he would ‘cut his losses’.
33 Until about 23 January 2023 the relationship between the plaintiff and the first defendant appeared to be harmonious – the first defendant had voiced no complaint about the plaintiff’s competence or integrity. That changed on 23 January 2023 when the first defendant accused the plaintiff of having a conflict of interest and otherwise acting in a manner that did not accord with his interests or instructions. Correspondence ensued between the plaintiff and the first defendant and in late January 2023 the first defendant purported to terminate his agreements with the plaintiff.
34 On 16 March 2023 the plaintiff applied to the court for an order that she cease being the solicitor acting for the first defendant in the pre‑action discovery application (there were costs issues that remained to be determined). On 27 March 2023 the first defendant filed a notice of change of representation recording that he intended to act in person.
35 On 1 May 2023 the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the first defendant in the Magistrates Court for the recovery of outstanding fees.
36 The first defendant made a complaint to the Legal Practice Board about the plaintiff’s conduct. Neither the details of the complaint nor the date on which it was made are apparent on the evidence.
37 On 24 May 2023 a senior resolution officer of the Legal Practice Board sent an email to the first defendant informing him, in effect, that the first defendant’s complaint about the plaintiff did not appear to involve a breach of duty under the applicable conduct rules or a breach of the professional standards expected of a legal practitioner. The email forms part of an email chain that ended with the 28 June 2023 email.
38 On 24 May 2023 the first defendant filed a document in the Magistrates Court proceedings making claims against the plaintiff. In that document the first defendant accused the plaintiff of colluding with the defendant in the pre‑action discovery application and committing perjury in those proceedings. Further, the first defendant stated that he believed it appropriate that, in effect, the plaintiff reimburse the second defendants all monies that they had paid to the plaintiff and that ‘criminal damages’ should be awarded against the Public Transport Authority.
39 On 25 May 2023 Mr Martin told the plaintiff that the first defendant had asked him whether he could file documents in the third defendant’s Metronet proceedings.
40 On 29 May 2023 the plaintiff had two telephone conversations with Mr Martin. Her evidence about those conversations was based on contemporaneous file notes kept by her and was as follows:

277. On 29 May 2023, I had a short discussion with Jerry which commenced at 11.57am.
278. In the course of that discussion:
     (a) Jerry told me that he had told Adam that:
     (i) he didn’t ‘want him interfering in my stuff’; and
     (ii) he ‘didn’t want to be witness’ for Adam;
     (b) Jerry also made some comments regarding [Mr J’s] mediation in the Supreme Court;
     (c) Jerry referred to comments which Adam was making about me;
     (d) I asked Jerry what Adam was saying;
     (e) Jerry told me that Adam was claiming that I was ‘the State’;
     (f) in response, I said ‘okay, right’, as I did not know what else to say; and
     (g) Jerry told me that Sean Nancarrow had told him to ‘stay away’ from Adam.
     …
279. On 29 May 2023, I received a call from Jerry at 4.51pm.
280. In the course of that discussion:
     (a) I told him that I had had a discussion with Barry Nilsson staff for 1.5 hours;
     (b) I told Jerry had attempted to go through each of the proposed categories with Jason Hart and Bertie Smallbone;
     (c) I told Jerry that in the course of the discussion, Jason Hart seemed angry, when I had noted that the proposed categories did not correlate with the matters put in issue by the Defendants;
     (d) I told Jerry that the outcome of the teleconference is that Barry Nilsson would provide a further categories;
     (e) Jerry advised me that Adam had called him 8 times that day;
     (f) Jerry told me that he thought that Adam was ‘out of control’;
     (g) Jerry told me that he had told Adam that:
     (i) he did not want anything to do with Adam’s claims; and
     (ii) that he told Adam ‘not to stuff his stuff up’;
     (h) Jerry said words to the effect that he didn’t know and didn’t care what Adam was claiming or doing;
     (i) we talked about timing of invoices and the stress regarding their finances;
     (j) at the end of the discussion, Jerry said that it was ‘all good.’
     41 On 31 May 2023 the plaintiff told Mr Martin that if the first defendant called him as a witness in the Magistrates Court proceedings that it might create a conflict of interest for the plaintiff.
     42 On 19 June 2023 the plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Mr Martin and Mr Sean Nancarrow. The plaintiff gave oral evidence to the effect that Mr Nancarrow was an associate of Mr Martin who had more experience of litigation than Mr Martin and someone to whom Mr Martin looked for assistance in understanding the litigation process. The conversation concerned the categories of discovery in the Metronet proceedings.
     43 Mr J was a businessperson who also had a claim for losses caused by the Metronet project. From time‑to‑time Mr Martin passed on to the plaintiff information that he said he obtained from Mr J about the conduct of his claim. The plaintiff had several conversations with Mr J in the period between October 2022 and March 2023 about the possibility that Mr J might instruct her to conduct his claim in place of his existing solicitors. Sometime after 28 June 2023 Mr J did change solicitors but did not instruct the plaintiff.
     44 On 28 June 2023 the first defendant sent the email referred to in [2] above. It appears that the 28 June 2023 email forwarded the email of 24 May 2023 that the first defendant had received from the Legal Practice Board. The email included other emails though it is not clear that they form part of a chain of sequential emails or whether the first defendant had simply added the other emails by cutting and pasting them from the originals. The full text of the email is reproduced in appendix 1.
     45 It is difficult to identify any rational explanation for the first defendant’s decision to send the 28 June 2023 email. The first defendant appears to have convinced himself that the plaintiff had some responsibility for the difficulties he encountered following the purchase of the car from Manheim Pty Ltd. Dissatisfied with the Legal Practice Board’s response to his complaint about the plaintiff, evidently, he considered sending the 28 June 2023 email an effective way of advancing his interests.
     46 On 29 June 2023 the plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Mr Nancarrow. The plaintiff’s evidence was to the effect that Mr Nancarrow told her the first defendant had sent an email which contained statements to the effect that Rossello Chambers did not exist and that the plaintiff was not a real lawyer.
     47 There is no evidence that any of the parties to whom the 28 June 2023 email was sent replied to it though the Legal Practice Board, to whom the email was copied, sent an email to the first defendant on 29 June 2023 stating that the Legal Practice Board’s email of 24 May 2023, which was forwarded as part of the 28 June 2023 email, was confidential.
     48 On 29 June 2023 the plaintiff had two telephone conversations with Mr Martin. Her evidence about those conversations was as follows:
281. At 12.02pm on 29 June 2023, I spoke with Jerry via by telephone for approximately 30 minutes.
282. In the course of the discussion:
     (a) Jerry told me that Adam had told him that Jerry being involved in Supreme Court proceedings was ‘like watching [someone] be raped’;
     (b) Jerry told me that he had said to Adam that he did not feel that way;
     (c) Jerry said that he had spoken with Dean, Tina Forde’s partner, but that it was a casual conversation about the fact that they both wished that the matters which Tina was helping them with had not ‘gone to shit’;
     (d) Jerry commented that categories of discovery were ‘a load of shit’ and that we were not even at the point of discovery;
     (e) Jerry became very upset during the course of the discussion;
     (f) Jerry then told me that Adam had asked to come to the hearing listed on 29 June 2023, to which Jerry had told him not to come;
     (g) Adam had then sent an email to various people, including members of the Supreme Court;
     (h) Jerry stated that ‘Adam was prepared to blow up everyone on the way through’;
     (i) I said ‘to get what he wants?’, to which Jerry said yes;
     (j) Jerry said that the ‘worst part’ of all of this was that he had introduced Adam to me, and that he felt bad that he had introduced Adam to me; and
     (k) Jerry stated that he felt ‘like Adam is trying to torpedo the case so that they can [we’ll] join up together against you’.
     …
283. On 29 June 2023, I telephoned Jerry at 3.49pm to tell him that the matter had been admitted to the CMC List.
284. In the course of our discussion:
     (a) I told Jerry that I had contacted the Legal Practice Board regarding Adam’s email to various people (which I had not yet seen);
     (b) I told Jerry that the Legal Practice Board staff member had told me that they were aware of the email, as they had been blind copied into the email;
     (c) I also informed Jerry that the Legal Practice Board had expressed concern about Adam’s behaviour, which appeared to be escalating;
     (d) I said to Jerry that Adam might think he was helping him, but I did not think that Adam was helping him;
     (e) Jerry told me that both Sean and he agreed that Adam was not helping him;
     (f) I told Jerry that I would not charge him for the time spent talking to either him or Sean regarding issues arising from Adam’s conduct;
     (g) Jerry said ‘That’s great’ and ‘Thanks’;
     (h) I stated that one of my concerns about Adam was that he appeared to extrapolate information from what might have been said, and gave the example that in the claim he had now made in the Magistrates’ Court he was claiming criminal damage;
     (i) I said to Jerry that we had never talked about criminal damages;
     (j) Jerry stated that he was ‘not aware where Adam gets things from’ and that he was ‘concerned that he’s [Adam’s] happy to blow things up for his own purposes’;
     (k) Jerry also stated that he was concerned that Adam was ignoring his requests, giving examples that he did not want Adam to attend court in the proceedings against Downers and he didn’t want him to send an email to the Supreme Court, but despite asking Adam to not do things, Adam had done what he wanted to do;
     (l) Jerry commented that Adam ‘thinks he’s a hero – he’s not’;
     (m) Jerry also expressed some general concerns about how Adam was behaving.
     49 On 10 July 2023 there was a hearing in the Magistrates Court between the first defendant and the plaintiff. During the hearing, the first defendant stated that the plaintiff was a ‘criminal’. He also said words to the effect that he had been sending emails to various people regarding the plaintiff, including ‘all of the members of the Supreme Court’. He also stated that he wanted to call the second defendants as witnesses in the Magistrates Court proceedings.
     50 Later in the day of 10 July 2023 the plaintiff told Mr Martin about what had occurred at the Magistrates Court hearing.
     51 On 13 July 2023 the plaintiff and Mr Martin had a telephone conversation in which they discussed the timetable for the Metronet proceedings. The plaintiff’s evidence about that discussion was as follows:
285. In the course of our discussion:
     (a) I advised Jerry that the matter had not been listed before the Court yet;
     (b) I explained to Jerry that now that the matter had been admitted to the CMC List, the matter would need to be allocated to a judge on the CMC List;
     (c) Jerry told me that he had issues with his PAYG liabilities with the ATO, and asked me about the timeframes associated with the litigation;
     (d) I said that the timeframes for the litigation were similar to what we had discussed before;
     (e) Jerry told me that he had spoken with Adam again;
     (f) Jerry told me that he had told Adam that he did not want Adam ‘to stuff things up’ and that he had told Adam ‘don’t torpedo my case’;
     (g) Jerry said that Adam’s response was that he did not seem to care;
     (h) we discussed that, contrary to Jerry’s wishes, Adam could call Jerry as a witness by subpoenaing him;
     (i) we discussed Adam’s claims and his conduct for some time;
     (j) as it was not chargeable work, I did not take a detailed [note] of these matters;
     (k) I told Jerry that I had not issued my invoice yet, but that I was considering giving him a discount, given that I knew things were tough for the business at that moment; and
     (l) in response to the comment about giving Jerry a discount, Jerry said ‘Thanks’.
     52 On 14 July 2023 the plaintiff rendered an account to the third defendant for her services in the Metronet dispute. The invoice recorded that the total time value of the plaintiff’s work was more than $7,000 but the plaintiff charged $5,500.
     53 On 17 July 2023 the first defendant sent an email to the plaintiff asking her to send him various documents. The first defendant listed 90 documents or categories of documents that he wanted the plaintiff to provide. Among the documents the first defendant requested were documents relating to ‘Rossello Chambers’.
     54 On 24 July 2023 the plaintiff saw the 28 June 2023 email for the first time. In her oral evidence she described the effect that reading the email had on her as follows:
     I felt like my stomach had dropped out of my body. It is one thing to hear that people are complaining about you, but to see allegations, words like fraud that hadn’t been attributed to you is – it is horrifying, horrifying. I mean, I still get emotional thinking about it. It is – I knew that there was going to be some – I had a flavour of what came through, but I didn’t understand the types of allegations that were being made about me and the extent of them until I saw that email.
     55 Between 13 and 28 July 2023 the plaintiff had further telephone conversations with Mr Martin to discuss the conduct of the Metronet proceedings. During those conversations Mr Martin expressed his frustration about the lack of progress in the proceedings and the costs that were being incurred. Mr Martin was particularly frustrated that the defendants, having engaged in discussions and correspondence about giving discovery by categories of documents, changed their position and proposed general discovery. He thought the defendants and their solicitors were ‘stalling’ and ‘trying to burn through his resources’. In one conversation Mr Martin said that he and Ms Martin were selling their cars to fund the litigation. Mr Martin had previously informed the plaintiff that the third defendant had received a $100,000 tax bill.
     56 On 27 July 2023 the plaintiff attended a ceremonial sitting of the Full Court of this court to welcome a newly appointed judge. When the plaintiff was walking through the Supreme Court Gardens on the way to court she felt that she received unusual looks from members of the judiciary. She described them as ‘curious stares’. After the hearing she felt that she was being stared at by members of the judiciary including the Chief Justice. The plaintiff’s evidence was to the effect that she feared the 28 June 2023 email had been circulated among members of the judiciary and that judges were reappraising her. She described a sense of rising panic that the first defendant’s communications could cause people with whom she had previously enjoyed a positive rapport to question her and her conduct.
     57 I accept that the plaintiff’s evidence accurately described her perceptions of the events before and after the ceremonial sitting on 27 July 2023, however, I find it unlikely that the 28 June 2023 email had been circulated to the judges mentioned in her evidence (though I accept it is possible the Chief Justice had seen it). I find it unlikely that the plaintiff’s perception of the judges’ demeanour towards her (though the perception was honestly held by her) accorded with the reality. It is unlikely that a judge would form an adverse view of the plaintiff based on the 28 June 2023 email. That was especially so if the judge was a person with whom the plaintiff had previously had a good rapport.
     58 On 31 July 2023 Mr Martin sent the email referred to in [3] above. The material parts of the 31 July 2023 email are reproduced in appendix 2.
     59 The 16 categories of documents sought by the second defendants in the email of 31 July 2023 duplicate categories 74 to 88 of the categories of documents sought by the first defendant from the plaintiff by his email of 17 July 2023. At a directions hearing held on 9 December 2024 the first defendant asked, ‘is it possible for me to take on all of the blame’. This question followed remarks made by the first defendant the effect of which was that the first defendant admitted being involved in the preparation of the 31 July 2023 email. These two matters considered in the context of the friendship between the first defendant and the second defendants and the first defendant’s conduct towards the plaintiff as described in these reasons satisfy me that the first defendant was involved in the preparation of the 31 July 2023 email.
     60 When the plaintiff read the 31 July 2023 email her first reaction was that Mr Martin ‘had been hacked’. I understood the effect of this evidence to be that her initial reaction to the 31 July 2023 email was that she did not believe it was genuine. She called Mr Martin’s mobile phone but received no response. She telephoned Mr Nancarrow and spoke to him. As a result of what Mr Nancarrow said the plaintiff realised that the email was genuine. Her evidence of her reaction to the email was as follows:
     At that moment, the enormity of the contents of the email and the identity of the recipients and the number of people it had been sent to hit me. I burst into tears. I had no idea what to do.
     61 The plaintiff telephoned Ms Smith who was in Sydney at the time. Ms Smith description of the telephone conversation was as follows:
     [The plaintiff] was hysterical. She told me that the client which had told her about the former client’s conduct had terminated her retainer by sending an email to ‘almost everyone in the legal profession’ saying that amongst other things, she had acted fraudulently and committed a series of crimes.
     It was hard to hear her, as she was crying so much, but I recall that she was expressing her humiliation, and hurt very clearly.
     Throughout my relationship with [the plaintiff], it appeared to me that she valued her career as a lawyer very highly and took her obligations to her clients very seriously, so I understood her reaction to what she had told me occurred.
     I was very worried about her during our discussion.
     After trying to calm her down a bit, I said words to the effect that I was in Sydney and so was not able to come over but that she needed a lawyer or barrister to assist her as I thought that it was not in her interests to keep acting in person. I asked if she would agree to me calling Stuart Shephard as he was a mutual friend. She agreed.
     62 The 31 July 2023 email attached a document entitled ‘Notice of change of representation, service details or address’ that adopted the style of Form 5AA set out in the second schedule of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA). In the form and next to the subsection titled ‘Name of new lawyer’, the accusations of criminal conduct and numbered paragraphs 1 to 16 set out in the 31 July 2023 email were reproduced.
     63 On 1 August 2023 the plaintiff sent an email to the court asking that the notice of change of representation attached to the 31 July 2023 email not be accepted for filing because among other matters it contained allegations that had no proper foundation and which she considered scandalous and defamatory. The plaintiff also sent an email to the associate to the judge who was case managing the Metronet proceedings requesting that the email and its attachment not be disseminated and be treated as confidential.
     64 The Central Office of the Supreme Court sent an email in response to the 31 July 2023 email containing a statement to the effect that the purported notice of change could not be accepted for filing and that pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) a body corporate may not carry on proceedings otherwise than by a solicitor.
     65 The plaintiff rendered a further account for her services to the third defendant on 8 August 2023. Neither that account nor the account rendered on 14 July 2023 were paid by the third defendant. The outstanding fees due by the third defendant to the plaintiff amounted to $8,008. These were the first of the plaintiff’s invoices the third defendant had failed to pay.
     66 The plaintiff attributed the third defendant’s failure to pay her the 14 July and 8 August 2023 invoices and the dramatic ending of her relationship with the second defendants to the effect of the first defendant’s email of 28 June 2023. I am not satisfied that was the case. I find that the second defendants’ decision to send the 31 July 2023 email was influenced by the first defendant, in the sense that he encouraged them and helped them to prepare it, but the email of 28 June 2023 was not in and of itself a contributing factor. As revealed in his conversations with the plaintiff in early July 2023 immediately following the 28 June 2023 email Mr Martin appeared to be concerned to keep the first defendant at a distance and not to permit the first defendant to become involved with the Metronet proceedings. While that position changed, I find that was due to the first defendant’s influence over the second defendants arising from their friendship. Their feelings of frustration with the litigation process and the financial stress they were experiencing meant the second defendants were susceptible to the first defendant’s influence and were willing to adopt the tactics the first defendant had adopted. I am not satisfied, however, that the 28 June 2023 email had any operative effect on the second defendants’ decision to send the 31 July 2023 email.
     67 The second defendants’ decision to send the email of 31 July 2023 was irrational. It reflected the irrationality of the first defendant’s attack on the plaintiff. The plaintiff had done nothing to justify the statements made about her in the email. They were entirely without foundation. Although Mr Martin had expressed his feelings of frustration to the plaintiff, he had not criticised her personally nor said anything to her that might indicate that he thought she had engaged in conduct of the nature described in the 31 July 2023 email. The shock felt by the plaintiff on reading the email and her subsequent distress are readily understandable.
     68 As observed in the preceding paragraph, the second defendants’ decision to send the 31 July 2023 email defies rational explanation. The second defendants have attempted to characterise the email as ‘a cry for help’. I do not accept this explanation for the following reasons. First, the second defendants did not raise the extremely serious allegations made in the email with the plaintiff or with any third party before sending the email. Second, there is no substance in the second defendants’ allegations against the plaintiff. Third, no sensible person, however frustrated or stressed they might be, would consider sending an email in the terms of the 31 July 2023 email a reasonable or sensible method of seeking assistance. Rather, in my judgment the ‘cry for help’ explanation was a belated attempt to justify conduct that was otherwise indefensible. Drawing on the content of the 31 July 2023 email, the first defendant’s apparent influence over the second defendants, and the allegations the second defendants made in support of their application for leave to pursue a counterclaim in these proceedings I infer the second defendants have identified the plaintiff as a scapegoat for the problems they and the third defendant have encountered.
     69 The plaintiff attributed the fact that she did not receive instructions from Mr J to take over the conduct of his Metronet litigation to the 28 June 2023 email. The plaintiff’s last conversation with Mr J was in March 2023. In the absence of evidence from Mr J or more compelling evidence from the plaintiff of his interest in instructing her I am not satisfied the 28 June 2023 email played any part in Mr J not instructing the plaintiff.
     70 On 16 August 2023 the plaintiff served a concerns notice on the second defendants. In that notice the plaintiff stated that if each of the second defendants provided her with a written undertaking that they would not make any further publications of the allegations contained in the 31 July 2023 email and agreed to provide a formal written apology and retraction she would be prepared to take no further action against the second defendants.
     71 On 25 August 2023 the plaintiff attended a hearing of her proceedings in the Magistrates Court. The second defendants were present in person in the court when the hearing started as were the first defendant’s parents. At the commencement of the hearing the plaintiff informed the magistrate that she understood the first defendant wished to call the second defendants as witnesses in the proceedings and that if that was so they should not be permitted to remain in the hearing room and similarly if the first defendant’s parents were going to be witnesses they should not be in the hearing room. The magistrate heard from the first defendant and ruled, in effect, that the proceedings were governed by s 28 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) and that as the case was a minor case the hearing should be held in private unless the court otherwise directed. The magistrate was not prepared to direct otherwise especially given the nature of the allegations made by the first defendant. At the conclusion of the hearing the magistrate dismissed the first defendant’s application for leave to file a counterclaim and entered judgment for the plaintiff in respect of her outstanding fees.
     72 On the evening of 25 August 2023 the plaintiff attended a professional development conference held in the South West of the State. At the conference dinner the plaintiff spoke to a judge of this court whom she had known for many years. The plaintiff explained to the judge that she was leaving the dinner early because she was exhausted by the drive to the conference and a hearing earlier in the day with a difficult former client. The judge remarked ‘might I have received emails from those people’ and the plaintiff responded ‘yes, I understand you have’. Based on this evidence I accept that some associates of judges of this court who received the 31 July 2023 email forwarded it to their judges.
     73 The present action was commenced on 21 December 2023.
     74 The plaintiff’s evidence was to the effect that she feels humiliated and embarrassed because of the emails. In her oral evidence she said she had turned ‘into a hermit pretty much’ and she explained she had withdrawn from the professional community. She said she no longer wanted to socialise or attend networking events. Her evidence was to the effect that her practice was heavily dependent on referrals from other solicitors. She described a reduction in the number of instructions she received. She said she had only received seven new instructions in 2024 compared to twenty‑two in the previous year.
     75 The plaintiff also described the effect of the emails on her mental health. She said her mental health had been ‘shocking’ and she had sought the assistance of a psychologist. Ms Smith described the plaintiff as being under immense stress due to her concern the allegations made will ruin her reputation and lead to the loss of her clients and legal practice.
     76 The plaintiff’s income from her practice in the financial year ending June 2024 was approximately 30% less than her income for the year ending June 2023 and her income in the first five months of the current financial year is approximately 56% of her income in the first five months of the financial year ending June 2023.
     77 On 9 January 2024 the first defendant filed an affidavit in these proceedings. The document comprised what could fairly be described as a rambling assortment of allegations against the Attorney‑General, the Australian Labor Party, the Chief Justice and others. In this document the first defendant asserted that every statement he had made about the plaintiff was true. The first defendant alleged that lawyers, including the plaintiff, had commenced proceedings against him that were entirely without legal merit and were intended to bankrupt him.
     78 On 16 February 2024 the first defendant filed a further document in which he claimed: each of the defendants were ‘victims of representatives of the plaintiff’, the plaintiff had committed crimes, the plaintiff had been used to steal money from the defendants and the plaintiff had prevented access to adequate legal counsel and a fair trial.
     79 On 21 February 2024 the first defendant sent an email to the associate to the Chief Justice, to my associate, to the court’s Central Office and to the plaintiff that attached a document in which he stated that he and the second defendants had accused the plaintiff of crimes including stealing over $200,000 and the plaintiff had acted with other lawyers to ‘pervert justice’. The first defendant filed further documents containing similar allegations on 28 February 2024.
     80 At a directions hearing held on 13 March 2024 the first defendant, having referred to a request that the court appoint a lawyer for him, which he said had been made in one of his documents, said:
     In the instance of me accusing the defendant of a crime, I believe that it has the obligation to provide me with a prosecutor.
     81 Later in the same hearing the first defendant asserted the plaintiff was an unqualified lawyer and that he wanted to be excused from attending a mediation, stating:
     because I have done everything I needed to do to arrange for a trial against the accused and if I can’t get one of those, I certainly don’t want to sit down for any mediation with them.
     82 At a directions hearing held on 24 June 2024 during submissions to the court the first defendant accused the plaintiff of crimes and, ignoring a direction from me not to do so, repeatedly pointed at the plaintiff as he was making his submissions. The first defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff to become distressed.
     83 On 8 July 2024 the first defendant sent an email to various addressees including the Attorney‑General, the Chief Justice, and my associate in which he made a number of bizarre allegations about the plaintiff and others. The first defendant accused the plaintiff of crimes.
     84 On 12 July 2024 the first defendant sent an email to various addressees including my associate and the plaintiff in which he stated that the plaintiff required prosecution.
     85 On 15 July 2024 the first defendant sent a further email to various addressees including my associate and the plaintiff in which he contested the plaintiff’s qualifications to practise law and that he wanted to examine both the plaintiff and the Chief Justice.
     86 On 10 January 2024 the second defendants filed a document headed ‘Notice of Divine Special Appearance’ the contents of which were an incoherent collection of pseudo law assertions including an assertion the court did not have jurisdiction over the second defendants. On 27 February 2024 Mr Martin sent emails to the plaintiff repeating his claims about the court’s lack of jurisdiction and accusing the plaintiff of incompetence.
     87 On 28 and 29 March 2024 the second defendants filed various documents setting out matters they wished to raise in their defence and by which they sought to justify the allegations of criminal conduct set out in the 31 July 2023 email.
     88 On 23 April 2024 Mr Martin sent an email to the plaintiff in which referring to the plaintiff’s action said:
     We therefore note that to be an action that interferes with Lawful Due Process, in an attempt to favour your position whilst silencing us.
     …
     In Maxim of Law that is slavery. Criminal Code 270. Slavery. 25 years jail.
     …
     We have no interest to continue to play in your playground, with your Rules, which have no binding upon us in any way, despite ourselves for the sake of assisting the flow of these matters, have adhered to some of the rules.
     89 During the course of the litigation process the second defendants made repeated allegations about the plaintiff’s conduct and competence. It is unnecessary to refer to the detail of these allegations but the substance of them was that the allegations made in the 31 July 2023 email against the plaintiff were true, the plaintiff was incompetent, and her incompetence resulted in them and the third defendant suffering losses and they were the victims of injustice.
     90 At a directions hearing held on 29 July 2024 I drew the second defendants’ attention to the potential that if they defended the plaintiff’s action on the basis that the allegations they had made in the 31 July 2023 email were true and that defence failed, aggravated damages might be awarded against them.
     Applicable legal principles
     Publication
     91 In the context of the law of defamation the term ‘publication’ has a technical meaning. It is understood as a bilateral act by which the publisher makes the defamatory material available and a third party has it available for their comprehension. It may be understood as the process by which a defamatory statement or imputation is conveyed. Any act of participation in the communication of defamatory matter to a third party is sufficient to make a defendant a publisher, regardless of their knowledge or intent. So understood, a person who has been instrumental in, or contributes to any extent to, the publication of defamatory matter is a publisher.
     Defamatory imputations
     92 In Lazos v West Australian Newspapers Pty Ltd, I outlined the principles governing whether imputations are conveyed by an allegedly defamatory publication by reference to what had been said by Chaney J in Rayney v Western Australia. I reproduce below the central principles summarised in Lazos:
     (a) The meaning of the words is to be ascertained by the sense in which fair-minded ordinary reasonable members of the general community would understand the published words.
     (b) The ordinary person does not live in an ivory tower and is not inhibited by a knowledge of the rules of construction. The ordinary reasonable reader can and does read between the lines in the light of their general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs.
     (c) A reader may be acting reasonably even though they engage in ‘a certain amount of loose thinking’.
     (d) The ordinary reasonable reader does not formulate reasons in their own mind: they get a general impression and one can expect them to look again before coming to a conclusion and acting on it. But formulated reasons are very often an afterthought.
     (e) Although an ordinary reasonable reader may engage in some loose thinking, they are not a person ‘avid for scandal’. A reasonable reader considers the publication as a whole. They try to strike a balance between the most extreme meaning that the words could have and the most innocent meaning. The reasonable reader considers the context as well as the words alleged to be defamatory. If ‘[i]n one part of [the] publication, something disreputable to the plaintiff is stated, but that is removed by the conclusion; the bane and antidote must be taken together’. But this does not mean that the reasonable reader does or must give equal weight to every part of the publication. The emphasis that the publisher supplies by inserting conspicuous headlines, headings and captions is a legitimate matter that readers do and are entitled to take into account. Contrary statements in an article do not automatically negate the effect of other defamatory statements in the article.
     (f) The mode and manner of publication is material to a consideration of the meaning of the words. The reader of a book, for example, is assumed to read it with more care than they would read a newspaper. The more sensational the article in a newspaper, the less likely it is that the ordinary reasonable reader will have read it with the degree of analytical care which may otherwise have been given to a book and the less the degree of accuracy which would be expected by the reader.
     (g) The meaning of the words is not determined by the evidence of the plaintiff as to what he understood the words to mean, nor by the evidence of the defendant as to what the defendant intended the words to mean. The meaning is to be determined by an assessment of the ordinary reasonable person’s understanding of the words.
     (h) The ordinary reasonable reader does not interpret the publication in a precise manner, but rather forms a general impression of the meaning from the words used.
     (i) Whereas, for a lawyer, an implication in a text must be necessary as well as reasonable, ordinary readers draw implications much more freely, especially when they are derogatory.
     (j) The meaning of the words is to be ascertained by the sense in which an ordinary reasonable reader would understand the words to mean. The court must undertake an objective evaluation to determine whether an ordinary reasonable reader would have understood the email to have conveyed any particular imputation or meaning. Whether the words convey a defamatory imputation will depend on the circumstances and context of a particular publication. [citation of authorities omitted]
     Damages
     93 There are three purposes to be served by damages awarded for defamation. They are consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the plaintiff by the publication, reparation for the harm done to the plaintiff’s personal and, if relevant, business reputation, and vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation. The first of these two purposes are often considered together and constitute consolation for the wrong done to the plaintiff. Vindication looks to the attitude of others to the plaintiff. The three purposes overlap and ensure that the amount awarded is ‘the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations’.
     94 Damages for injured feelings, however innocent the publication by the defendant may have been, form a large element in the assessment. The harm caused to plaintiffs by defamatory material often lies more in their own feelings about what others are thinking of them than in any actual change manifest in the attitudes of others towards them. A person publishing defamatory imputations must take plaintiffs as they find them. Accordingly, it is appropriate to have regard to the individual sensitivities of a plaintiff.
     95 The sum awarded must be at least the minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation. The gravity of the defamation and the social standing of the parties are relevant to assessing the quantum of damages necessary to effect vindication of the plaintiff. Damage to reputation need not be proved as it is presumed. The level of damages should reflect the high value which the law places upon reputation and, in particular, upon the reputation of those whose work and life depends upon their honesty, integrity and judgment.
     96 The circumstance that a respondent has not provided any apology is pertinent.
     97 Damages are ‘at large’ in the sense that they cannot be arrived at through calculation or the application of a formula, and are therefore necessarily imprecise.
     98 Damages may be aggravated or mitigated by the manner in which the defamatory matter was published and by subsequent conduct of a defendant. Damages may be increased if there is ‘a lack of bona fides in the defendant’s conduct or it is improper or unjustifiable’. Aggravated damages are compensatory in nature:
     The concept of ‘aggravated’ damages is not, whether calculated separately or not, a different ‘head’ of damages. It focuses on the circumstances of the wrongdoing which have made the impact of it worse for the plaintiff. It is not to go beyond compensation for the aggravation of the harm to repute or feelings. It is not a means for punishing a defendant.
     99 The failure to publish a retraction or an apology may make an award of aggravated damages appropriate if it amounts to a continuing assertion of the defamatory imputations.
     100 Section 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 (WA) requires that, in assessing the amount of damages, ‘the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded’.
     The 28 June 2023 email
     The pleaded case
     101 Relevantly, the plaintiff’s pleaded case is as follows:
286. In their natural and ordinary meaning, the words published in the 28 June Email defamed the Plaintiff and were meant and understood to mean that the Plaintiff:
     20.1 had committed criminal offences by conducting her business of providing legal services fraudulently by:
     20.1.1 using the group practice name ‘Rossello Chambers’ (paragraphs 18.4, 18.7, 18.8, 18.9; 18.10, 18.11);
     20.1.2 dishonestly commencing proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia in the name of the First Defendant against Benjamin Stewart without instructions from First Defendant (paragraph 18.10);
     20.1.3 dishonestly relied upon an invalid retainer agreement to commence proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia against the First Defendant claiming payment from the First Defendant (paragraph 18.10);
     20.1.4 rendering invoices for work performed contrary to the Legal Practice Act 2008 or the Legal Profession Uniform Act to:
     20.1.4.1 the First Defendant;
     20.1.4.2 the Second Defendants;
     20.1.4.3 [Mr J];
     (paragraph 18.9)
     20.1.5 dishonestly rendering invoices to the First Defendant, Second Defendants, and [Mr J] for work:
     20.1.5.1 not actually performed; or
     20.1.5.2 not actually performed to an acceptable standard;
     (paragraph 18.9)
     20.1.6 intentionally acting for the First Defendant, Second Defendants, and [Mr J] in a manner intended to obstruct and delay the proper hearing and resolution of court proceedings commenced by them (paragraph 18.9); and
     20.1.7 knowingly using invalid Retainer Agreements for the provision of legal services to fraudulently obtain financial gain from:
     20.1.7.1 the First Plaintiff (paragraph 18.10); and
     20.1.7.2 three other (unnamed) persons (paragraph 18.12); and
     20.1.7.3 20 other (unnamed) persons (paragraph 18.11);
     20.2 had breached her duties to the Supreme Court of Western Australia and acted unprofessionally by fraudulently representing her clients, the Second Defendants, in matter CIV 2301 of 2022, and intended to continue to do so (paragraph 18.7);
     20.3 acted unprofessionally by failing to provide legal services to her clients that met the standards required by the Legal Profession Act 2008 and the Legal Profession Uniform Law (paragraph 18.9);
     20.4 acted unprofessionally against the interest of her clients, including the First Defendant, by intentionally preventing her clients from having their claims heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia (paragraph 18.9);
     20.5 acted unprofessionally against the interests of her clients in proceedings against ‘representatives of the Western Australian Government’ when she had a direct conflict of interest because she was, herself, a representative of the Western Australian Government and, in doing so, caused her clients, including the First Defendant, financial harm (paragraph 18.13); and
     20.6 illegally conspired with the Western Australian Government, in an unspecified manner, to prevent her clients bringing claims against the Government of Western Australia and to cause her clients financial damage (paragraphs 18.11 and 18.13).
     102 The plaintiff pleaded the first defendant published the 28 June 2023 email maliciously. She also pleaded that the first defendant’s conduct had aggravated the damage she had suffered.
     Disposition
     103 A consequence of my order of 5 August 2024 and the failure of the first defendant to file a defence is that the plaintiff is entitled to proceed with the assessment of damages on the basis that the first defendant has admitted that the pleaded imputations are conveyed by the 28 June 2023 email and are defamatory. There is, however, a substantial degree of overlap between the pleaded imputations. I am not satisfied that each pleaded imputation conveys a distinct defamatory sting.
     104 In my judgment, the following imputations were conveyed clearly by the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in the 28 June 2023 email:
     (a) The plaintiff had and was continuing to commit fraud by using the name ‘Rossello Chambers’ in her practice as a lawyer.
     (b) The plaintiff’s legal services failed to meet the standards expected of a legal practitioner.
     (c) The plaintiff’s legal services were so far below the standards expected of a legal practitioner that they obstructed the determination by the court of her clients’ matters.
     (d) The plaintiff was using an invalid retainer agreement to obtain a financial gain from the first defendant.
     105 The imputations are clearly defamatory.
     106 The first defendant had no basis whatsoever for making the statements contained in the 28 June 2023 email. No defence of any nature has been disclosed in any of the materials the first defendant has filed or attempted to file. The allegations the first defendant made against the plaintiff in the 28 June 2023 email during these proceedings were bizarre, irrational, scandalous and calculated to distress the plaintiff and dissuade her from pursuing the action. At the risk of repetition, the first defendant’s allegations have no basis in fact. I find that when the first defendant published the 28 June 2023 email he was actuated by malice in the sense that he wanted to injure the plaintiff in her reputation and that was also his motivation for making allegations against the plaintiff in the course of these proceedings. I infer this was so from the absence of any factual basis for the imputations I have found were conveyed by the 28 June 2023 email, the scandalous nature of those imputations and the first defendant’s repetition of the serious allegations he made against the plaintiff.
     107 I make the following observations in relation to the assessment of damages.
     108 First, I am satisfied that the publication of the 28 June 2023 email has caused the plaintiff a significant amount of distress flowing from her genuinely held concern that members of the judiciary had reason to question her professional integrity and competence. While a dispassionate observer would conclude that judges would not give any credence to the contents of the 28 June 2023 email, quite understandably, the plaintiff did not look at the potential damage to her reputation with such objectivity and equanimity. The plaintiff had worked hard over nearly two decades to establish her professional reputation and it is understandable she would have been fearful about the damage to her reputation that might be caused by the 28 June 2023 email.
     109 Second, and related to the first observation, this is a case in which the harm caused to the plaintiff lies more in her own feelings about what others are thinking of her than in any actual change manifest in the attitudes of others towards her. I have not referred to all the plaintiff’s evidence about the effect of the publication of the 28 June 2023 email on her but, as I have said, I have no doubt she was greatly distressed by it. That said, I am not persuaded the publication of the 28 June 2023 email caused actual damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. There was no direct evidence of actual damage to the plaintiff’s reputation and the evidence does not justify drawing an inference of actual damage. An additional reason why I am not prepared to draw an inference of actual damage is because in my judgment a judge, or a lawyer who was considering referring work to the plaintiff, reading the 28 June 2023 email would consider the allegations made with a great deal of scepticism and would not give them any credence. It might be thought there is some tension between this view and my finding about the imputations conveyed by 28 June 2023 email but it must be remembered that the test for whether imputations are conveyed embodies the concept of the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader whereas for the purposes of assessing damages, attention must be given to the actual effect on the plaintiff’s reputation.
     110 Third, the publication of the 28 June 2023 email was improper in the sense that there was absolutely no justification for it. Not only was there an absence of good faith but the first defendant acted maliciously. Both the circumstances of the publication and the first defendant’s subsequent conduct aggravated the plaintiff’s injury in a very real and very significant sense. Not only did the first defendant fail to apologise but he repeated the substance of the defamatory imputations in his attempts to defend the action. Pursuing her action in the face of the first defendant’s continued attacks required the plaintiff to overcome her feelings of anxiety caused by the first defendant’s conduct and demonstrate real fortitude. Having made those points, I bear in mind that the purpose of awarding aggravated damages is to compensate a plaintiff not to punish a defendant.
     111 Fourth, for the reasons I have given I am not satisfied the publication of the 28 June 2023 email caused the plaintiff to suffer the economic loss claimed by her.
     112 Fifth, the publication was limited to those to whom the email was addressed and those to whom it was blind copied. Although I am conscious of the possibility the email achieved wider circulation, I think that is unlikely.
     113 Sixth, the publication of these reasons provides a substantial vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation.
     114 I would assess the plaintiff’s damages at $70,000. This sum includes an allowance for aggravated damages.
     The 31 July 2023 email
     The pleaded case
     115 Relevantly, the plaintiff’s pleaded case is as follows:
     29.1 In the course of providing legal services, the plaintiff committed the following crimes:
     29.1.1 compounding or concealing an offence or offences within the meaning of section 136, Criminal Code WA;
     29.1.2 corrupting a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of section 130, Criminal Code WA;
     29.1.3 deceiving a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of s 130, Criminal Code WA;
     29.1.4 conspiring with unnamed persons to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of section 135, Criminal Code WA;
     29.1.5 attempting to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of section 143, Criminal Code WA;
     29.1.6 fraud within the meaning of section 409, Criminal Code WA;
     29.2 In the course of providing legal services, the Plaintiff demonstrated she was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner.
     29.3 In the alternative to paragraph 29.1, there were reasonable grounds to suspect that in the course of providing legal services the plaintiff committed the following crimes:
     29.3.1 compounding or concealing an offence or offences within the meaning of section 136, Criminal Code WA;
     29.3.2 corrupting a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of section 130, Criminal Code WA;
     29.3.3 deceiving a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of s 130, Criminal Code WA;
     29.3.4 conspiring with unnamed persons to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of section 135, Criminal Code WA;
     29.3.5 attempting to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of section 143, Criminal Code WA;
     29.3.6 fraud within the meaning of section 409, Criminal Code WA;
     116 The plaintiff pleads the publication of the 31 July 2023 email was actuated by malice on the part of the defendants. She also pleaded that the defendants’ conduct had aggravated the damage she had suffered.
     Disposition
     The defendants were publishers
     117 For the reasons I have already given I am satisfied the first defendant was involved in the preparation of the 31 July 2023 email and that for the purposes of the law of defamation he was a publisher of the email.
     118 The second defendants do not dispute they prepared the email or that it was sent by Mr Martin on behalf of them both. Although they contested that the email was not ‘published’ in the sense in which the term is used by lay people in everyday language, for the purposes of the law of defamation they were publishers of the email. While not every act of a director of a company is to be regarded as an act done on behalf of the company, in publishing the email of 31 July 2023 the second defendants were plainly acting on behalf of themselves and the third defendant because the third defendant was the plaintiff in the Metronet proceedings on whose behalf the purported notice of change of representation was being filed. The third defendant was a publisher of the email.
     The imputations conveyed
     119 I find the 31 July 2023 email conveyed the following imputations:
     (a) There were reasonable grounds for investigating whether in the course of providing legal services the plaintiff had committed the following crimes:
     i. compounding or concealing an offence or offences within the meaning of s 136, Criminal Code WA;
     ii. corrupting a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of s 130, Criminal Code WA;
     iii. deceiving a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of s 130, Criminal Code WA;
     iv. conspiring with unnamed persons to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of s 135, Criminal Code WA;
     v. attempting to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of s 143, Criminal Code WA; and
     vi. fraud within the meaning of s 409, Criminal Code WA.
     (b) There were reasonable grounds for investigating whether the plaintiff was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner.
     120 My findings as to the imputations are based on the ordinary and natural meanings of the words used in the email. No further exposition is required other than to record I consider that the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the statements made in the email of 31 July 2023 in the terms the second defendants contended they would be understood, that is, the second defendants accused the plaintiff of the conduct described in the email and there were reasonable grounds for investigating those accusations. I do not accept the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the email as conveying the imputation that the plaintiff had in fact committed crimes and was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner.
     121 The imputations are clearly defamatory.
     Defences
     122 The defence of justification is governed by s 25 of the Defamation Act which provides:
     Defence of Justification
     It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations carried by the matter of which the plaintiff complains are substantially true.
     123 On 16 September 2024 I made a direction that by 11 October 2024 the second defendants were to file and serve a statement identifying the conduct of the plaintiff relied on by them to establish the truth of each meaning in paragraph 29 of the statement of claim which they wished to justify.
     124 The second defendants filed a document on 12 October 2024 that set out the basis of their justification defence. The document responded to an earlier version of the statement of claim that pleaded the imputations conveyed by the 31 July 2023 email in terms that differed from the imputations in the final version of the statement of claim (as reproduced above) though the substance of the imputations was to the same effect. It is impossible to convey the full nature and extent of the second defendants’ attempt to justify their accusations of criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff without reproducing the following lengthy extracts from the 12 October 2024 document.
287. Overview
     1.1. This submission is made as a counterclaim in response to the Plaintiff’s claims of defamation. The counterclaim establishes that the statements made by the defendants are not defamatory but are accurate representations of the legal services received from Ms. Michelmore.
     1.2. The counterclaim seeks an order to cover damages totalling $5,599,000 as detailed below.
     1.3. While we may have innocently used inappropriate channels to express our distress, it was a cry for help, with the expectation that our grievances would be taken seriously and that a mechanism existed to hold parties accountable. The damages are real and significant, as evidenced below.
     1.4. As defendants, we have come to learn that there is no mechanism, other than this legal action, to seek accountability. The ongoing process has repeatedly indicated by the Court that this case does not appear favorable for us, reinforcing a sense of isolation and discouraging complaints. The financial and emotional costs of this legal ordeal have been immense.
     1.5. Initially, as defendants, we believed we were engaged in a lawful process. However, we have come to learn that the system is privately controlled. As Executors and Beneficiaries, we hold accountability for damages to our assets and valuable time, and we expect the Supreme Court to consider the events that led to the defamation claim. The submission details behaviors encountered during this time that fall below acceptable and logical standards, and we look forward to a rapid and equitable resolution.
288. The counterclaim is based on six matters, as substantiated below:
     Claim 1: Compounding and Concealing Offenses (Criminal Code Section 132)
     Claim 2: Corruption of a Witness (Criminal Code Section 123)
     Claim 3: Deceiving a Witness (Criminal Code Section 123)
     Claim 4: Conspiring to Pervert the Course of Justice (Criminal Code Section 143)
     Claim 5: Attempting to Pervert the Course of Justice (Criminal Code Section 143)
     Claim 6: Fraud (Criminal Code Section 409)
     2.2. These claims pertain to Ms. Michelmore’s legal representation of the defendants in matters involving:
     The lease of Unit 101, The Precinct, Mount Pleasant.
     Metronet Deny Ave removal project roadworks outside the defendants’ business in Kelmscott.
     …
289. Supporting Evidence of Claims Made
     4.1. Claim 1: Compounding and Concealing Offenses (Criminal Code Section 132)
     4.1.1. Claim: Ms. Michelmore compounded or concealed significant issues related to the defendants’ legal matters by failing to take appropriate action on critical evidence, particularly concerning regulatory violations at Unit 101, The Precinct, and omitting important claims in the Metronet case (CIV2301 /2022).
     4.1.2. Details: Andrew Roberts, Director of Mapel Building, informed Ms. Michelmore that Unit 101, The Precinct was not up to code. His incomplete witness statement indicated that the developer had not met council approval requirements and that the certificate of occupancy was issued erroneously.
     4.1.3. The defendants engaged Ms. Michelmore to render the lease null and void due to the building’s non‑compliance with regulatory standards and to recover funds invested in the fit-out, chattels, and bond. Ms. Michelmore referred to pursuing the bond as ‘opening a can of worms.’ No remedy was provided.
     4.1.4. If Ms. Michelmore had completed Roberts’ statement, an insurance claim could have been made for damages to recover the funds. Instead, the defendants spent $55,185.30 in legal fees with Ms. Michelmore without results.
     4.1.5. Tina Forde (legal practitioner) of Macaulay legal started litigation for Unit 101 The Precinct but had to step away due to becoming a barrister and recommended Ms. Michelmore. Ms. Forde’s legal fees totaled [sic] $17,934.40.
     4.1.6. Total legal fees for the Unit 101 The Precinct matter amounted to $73,119.00.
     4.1.7. In the Metronet case (CIV2301/2022), $839,000 in damages due to restricted access were substantiated by a forensic report (Exhibit B). Ms. Michelmore pursued the claim as a nuisance rather than addressing the core issue of restricted access, leading to significant financial losses.
     4.1.8. Evidence of malicious intent by Metronet exists, as shown by the differences in the construction of the defendants’ driveway to ensure it was unsafe for vehicles, as well as the continued caging of the entrance.
     4.1.9. Ms. Michelmore’s suppression of stronger claims coincided with a complaint filed against her by Adam Brown in May 2023, raising concerns that this influenced her legal strategy.
     4.1.10. Damages: The failure to pursue stronger legal claims in both Unit 101, The Precinct, and Metronet matters contributed to a loss of $839,000 in CIV2301/2022 and further financial losses from prolonged litigation.
     …
290. Claim 2: Corruption of a Witness (Criminal Code Section 123)
     5.1. Claim: Ms. Michelmore attempted to manipulate witness testimony by discouraging the defendants from participating in a related case and offering financial incentives to influence their involvement.
291. Details:
     5.1 On 29 May 2023, during a phone call, Ms. Michelmore disclosed confidential information about Adam Brown’s legal situation, including potential conflicts of interest and plans to involve the defendants as witnesses in his case against her.
     5.2 On 29 June 2023, Ms. Michelmore implied that assisting Mr. Brown would jeopardize the defendants’ case regarding the Metronet case CIV2301/2022.
     5.3 During a 13 July 2023 call, Ms. Michelmore implied [sic] to reduce legal fees if the defendants refrained from participating as witnesses in Mr. Brown’s case.
     5.4 A Concerns Notice was issued on 16 Auaust 2023 to apply pressure on the defendants to not testify at a hearing on 25 August 2023.
     5.6 The defendants did not see the Notice until after the hearing, as it was found in the letterbox.
     5.7 The defendants were removed from the court and the courtroom was sealed, leaving Adam Brown alone.
     …
292. Claim 3: Deceiving a Witness (Criminal Code Section 123)
     6.1 Claim: Ms. Michelmore misrepresented the legal strategy and failed to provide critical information, impacting the defendants’ case.
     6.2 Details:
     6.3 Ms. Michelmore knew the certificate of occupancy for The Precinct was issued in error but did not disclose this to the defendants.
     6.4 The Metronet case was pursued as a Nuisance Claim, leading the defendants to believe it was being handled effectively, despite delays.
     6.5 The case should have been pursued as trespass, malicious intent, and prolonged delays.
     6.6 Ms. Michelmore’s failure to act promptly coincided with efforts to dissuade the defendants from supporting Mr. Brown.
     6.7 Damages: The misrepresentation of the status of the Nuisance Claim contributed to the undervaluation of the $839,000 in damages by the insurance company. The claim was pursued as a Nuisance Claim through Metronet’s insurance, resulting in an opening offer of $60,000 and a final settlement of $150,000.
     …
293. Claim 4: Conspiring to Pervert the Course of Justice (Criminal Code Section 143)
     7.1. Ms. Michelmore conspired to obstruct justice by discouraging stronger claims in favor of weaker strategies.
     7.2. Details:
     7.3 The failure to pursue stronger claims caused prolonged litigation.
     7.4 The case was handled as a Nuisance Notice rather than a Trespass and Malicious Intent claim.
     7.5 Challenges to building code standards were dismissed by Ms. Michelmore, who referred to pursuing the bond as ‘opening a can of worms.’
     7.6 Ms. Michelmore’s actions may have shielded other parties from liability, including developers involved in Unit 101, The Precinct, and Metronet.
     7.8 Evidence: Correspondence related to the claims (Exhibit H).
     …
294. Claim 5: Attempting to Pervert the Course of Justice (Criminal Code Section 143)
     8.1. Ms. Michelmore’s handling of the Unit 101, The Precinct, and Metronet CIV2301/2022 matters, including delays and omissions, impaired the defendants’ legal outcomes.
     8.2. Details: Ms. Michelmore’s decision to pursue a weaker nuisance claim resulted in prolonged litigation and financial strain.
     8.3 Her inaction regarding Andrew Roberts’ witness statement on regulatory violations obstructed justice by limiting the defendants’ ability to seek appropriate remedies.
     8.4 Damages: Financial losses amounted to $839,000 for Metronet CIV2301/2022 and $660,000 for issues related to damages associated with The Precinct.
     8.5 Evidence: Correspondence regarding claims handling and delays (Exhibit H).
295. Claim 6: Fraud (Criminal Code Section 409)
     9.1. Ms. Michelmore engaged in fraudulent conduct by billing for incomplete services and misrepresenting the strength of the defendants’ legal cases.
     9.2. Details:
     9.3. Ms. Michelmore billed the defendants for a witness statement from Andrew Roberts that was never finalized.
     9.4. The timing of the concern notice and her refusal to release essential documents after her services were terminated obstructed the defendants’ ability to seek proper legal remedies through new counsel, Belmont Legal.
     9.5. Similar behavior is evidenced in matters currently before the Supreme Court in CIV2457 /2023.
     125 On 14 October 2024, on the basis of the second defendants’ 12 October document, I directed their justification defence be limited to the matters alleged in paragraphs 5.1 to 5.7 and 9.1 to 9.3 of the second defendants’ submission filed on 12 October 2024.
     126 As to the matters alleged in paragraphs 5.1 to 5.7 of the second defendants’ 12 October 2024 document:
     (a) On 29 May 2023 the first defendant was no longer a client of the plaintiff. There is no evidence the plaintiff disclosed any information confidential to the first defendant to the second defendants. The plaintiff discussed the Magistrates Court proceedings between her and the first defendant with Mr Martin. Those discussions did not involve the disclosure of confidential information and the discussions occurred because the first defendant was trying to involve the second defendants in those proceedings.
     (b) Earlier in these reasons I have reproduced the plaintiff’s evidence of the content of her telephone conversations with Mr Martin on 29 June and 13 July 2023, which I accept. There is no evidence which supports the allegations made in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3.
     (c) The plaintiff’s concerns notice was dated 16 August 2023 some 17 days after the 31 July 2023 email. There is no basis upon which the concerns notice can support any allegation made in the 31 July 2023 email. Two further matters demonstrate the hopeless nature of this aspect of the second defendants’ attempt to justify their allegations. First, the hearing in the Magistrates Court on 25 August 2023 did not require either party to call evidence from witnesses and second, it does not appear the second defendants could give any relevant evidence in the Magistrates Court proceedings.
     (d) The second defendants were excluded from the hearing in the Magistrates Court on 25 August 2023 because it was a requirement of the applicable legislation that the hearing be held in private.
     127 Turning to the matters alleged in paragraphs 9.1 to 9.3 of the second defendants’ 12 October 2024 document, the plaintiff explained in her evidence why Mr Roberts’ draft proof of evidence was not completed. I have accepted the plaintiff’s evidence. The plaintiff was entitled to charge the third defendant for the work undertaken by her in meeting Mr Roberts and preparing a draft proof of evidence. The allegation the plaintiff had engaged in fraud is entirely without any foundation.
     128 None of the materials filed by the second defendants in these proceedings disclose any factual foundation that might conceivably constitute grounds justifying an investigation into the plaintiff’s conduct.
     129 In the document filed by the second defendants on 18 December 2024 they referred to the defences of absolute privilege and qualified privilege and I will explain briefly why neither defence could assist the second defendants.
     130 Relevantly, s 27 of the Defamation Act provides:
     Defence of absolute privilege
     (1) It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that it was published on an occasion of absolute privilege.
     (2) Without limiting subsection (1), matter is published on an occasion of absolute privilege if —
     (a) …
     (b) the matter is published in the course of the proceedings of an Australian court or Australian tribunal, including (but not limited to) —
     (i) the publication of matter in any document filed or lodged with, or otherwise submitted to, the court or tribunal (including any originating process);
     (ii) the publication of matter while giving evidence before the court or tribunal; and
     (iii) the publication of matter in any judgment, order or other determination of the court or tribunal;
     131 The defence of absolute privilege could not assist the second defendants because the 31 July 2023 email was published to some persons with no connection to the court. Further, it cannot be said that the 31 July 2023 email was published in the course of proceedings before the court. The email was published for the entirely extraneous purpose of airing the second defendants’ complaints about the plaintiff. The defence of absolute privilege cannot be invoked by the simple expedient of sending a document containing defamatory material to the associates of judicial officers or to the administrative office of a court.
     132 Section 30 of the Defamation Act provides:
     Defence of qualified privilege for provision of certain information
     (1) There is a defence of qualified privilege for the publication of defamatory matter to a person (the recipient) if the defendant proves that —
     (a) the recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having information on some subject;
     (b) the matter is published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient information on that subject; and
     (c) the conduct of the defendant in publishing that matter is reasonable in the circumstances.
     (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a recipient has an apparent interest in having information on some subject if, and only if, at the time of the publication in question, the defendant believes on reasonable grounds that the recipient has that interest.
     (3) In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the defendant in publishing matter about a person is reasonable in the circumstances, a court may take into account —
     (a) the extent to which the matter published is of public interest;
     (b) the extent to which the matter published relates to the performance of the public functions or activities of the person;
     (c) the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published;
     (d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts;
     (e) whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances for the matter published to be published expeditiously;
     (f) the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates;
     (g) the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources;
     (h) whether the matter published contained the substance of the person’s side of the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the defendant to obtain and publish a response from the person;
     (i) any other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published; and
     (j) any other circumstances that the court considers relevant.
     (4) For the avoidance of doubt, a defence of qualified privilege under subsection (1) is defeated if the plaintiff proves that the publication of the defamatory matter was actuated by malice.
     133 The statutory defence of qualified privilege does not assist the second defendants’ because their conduct in publishing the defamatory imputations was not reasonable. To the contrary, their conduct was manifestly unreasonable. It was unreasonable to make such serious allegations against the plaintiff without raising them with her first. It was unreasonable to make such baseless allegations. Further, I am satisfied the publication of the 31 July 2023 email was actuated by malice. I infer this was so from the two matters to which I have just referred.
     134 The common law defence of qualified privilege applies where the publisher of a defamatory statement has a relevant duty or interest to make that statement and the recipient has a corresponding duty or interest to receive it. The common law defence of qualified privilege does not assist the second defendants because the 31 July 2023 email was published to an extensive group of recipients many of whom had no duty or interest in receiving the email.
     135 Turning now to the question of damages. Many of the considerations to which I referred when analysing the issue of damages in the context of the claim arising from the 28 June 2023 email are relevant to the plaintiff’s claim arising from the 31 July 2023 email. Thus, there is a degree of repetition in the observations that follow.
     136 First, I accept the publication of the 31 July 2023 email caused the plaintiff significant distress flowing from her genuinely held concern that it would give members of the judiciary reason to question her professional integrity and competence. Ms Smith’s evidence about her conversation with the plaintiff on the evening of 31 July 2023 speaks powerfully of the distress experienced by the plaintiff as does the plaintiff’s own evidence on the effect on her of the publication of the 31 July 2023 email. I find that the publication of the 31 July 2023 email caused the plaintiff greater distress than the 28 June 2023 email because it was sent to a larger group of people and, understandably the plaintiff would have been concerned about the potential cumulative effect of two emails making serious allegations against her.
     137 Second, and as with the 28 June 2023 email, my strong impression is that the harm caused to the plaintiff lies more in her fear of what others are thinking of her than in any actual change manifest in the attitude of others towards her. As already stated, I accept that the plaintiff felt the possibility that members of the court and their associates might form an adverse view of her very keenly. Although I think it most unlikely that any judge would form a negative view of the plaintiff based on the 31 July 2023 email, the plaintiff’s fear that they might do so was an understandable reaction.
     138 Third, and following on from the point made in the preceding paragraph, the evidence does not satisfy me that the plaintiff suffered actual damage in her reputation.
     139 Fourth, the second defendants’ conduct has significantly aggravated the injury to the plaintiff. In publishing the 31 July 2023 email the second defendants acted unreasonably and with an absence of good faith and in relation to these matters I refer to the observations made earlier in these reasons. The second defendants have maintained their accusations of criminal conduct against the plaintiff and have maintained that her legal advice and assistance has caused them and the third defendant significant losses when there is no foundation in fact for those accusations. I infer from the fact that the pseudo law concepts espoused by the second defendants during these proceedings did not appear to form any part of their thinking when they were instructing the plaintiff to pursue the third defendant’s claim for damages, that they invoked them as part of a strategy to make it more difficult for the plaintiff to pursue her claim against them. I find the second defendants’ conduct aggravated the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
     140 Fifth, I am not persuaded the 31 July 2023 email has caused the plaintiff to suffer the financial losses claimed by her by way of special damages. I accept the plaintiff has experienced a reduction in the number of instructions received by her and she has experienced a reduction in her turnover and net profit but in the absence of evidence that the email had a negative effect on the attitude of others towards her I am not prepared to infer the reduction in the instructions received by the plaintiff and the reduction in her income were caused by the publication of the email. While this is not a matter of decisive significance, the comparison of the instructions received and turnover/profit between the financial years ending 30 June 2023 and 30 June 2024 is not a solid foundation for a claim of lost profits. The vicissitudes of legal practice may provide other explanations for the reduction in the instructions received by the plaintiff and the reduction in her fee income.
     141 Sixth, the number of people to whom the 31 July 2023 email was sent exceeded the number to whom the 28 June 2023 email was sent but the number was still relatively limited. Moreover, while I accept some of the judges whose associates received the email may have read it, I have reservations about how many will have done so, and I am confident that no judge would have given any credence to the accusations made in the email. I think it is unlikely that those outside the judicial community to whom the email was sent would have paid any attention to it.
     142 Having regard to the observations made in the preceding paragraphs I consider the plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages of $90,000. This figure is inclusive of aggravated damages. In assessing aggravated damages, and in order to avoid double counting, I have not attached any weight to the aggravating conduct of the first defendant. This is accounted for in the award of damages made against the first defendant in respect of the 28 June 2023 email.
     Injunctive relief
     143 The plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction restraining the publication of defamatory imputations by the defendants. The conduct of the defendants towards the plaintiff is reminiscent of a vendetta against her. In my judgment there is a real possibility that unless restrained the defendants will make statements that repeat the defamatory imputations conveyed by the two emails. The plaintiff is entitled to the injunctive relief sought by her.
     Conclusion
     144 In respect of the 28 June 2023 email the plaintiff is entitled to damages from the first defendant in the sum of $70,000.
     145 In respect of the 31 July 2023 email the plaintiff is entitled to damages from the defendants in the sum of $90,000.
     146 An injunction will be granted restraining the defendants from making statements that repeat the defamatory imputations conveyed by the emails of 28 June 2023 and 31 July 2023 or statements to a like effect.
     147 As to costs I make the following directions:
     (a) The plaintiff is to file and serve a minute of any costs orders sought by her together with submissions in support of such orders sought by her and a bill of the costs sought by her by 31 January 2025.
     (b) The defendants are to file and serve submissions in opposition to the costs orders sought by the plaintiff together with a schedule of objections to the costs sought by the plaintiff by 21 February 2025.
     (c) The basis on which the plaintiff is entitled to any costs order in her favour and the quantum of any such costs will be determined on the papers.
     
     Appendix 1
     From: adam@ikube.com.au adam@ikube.com.au
     Sent: Wednesday, 28 June 2023 4:01 PM
     To: ‘mail’ ; Chief.Justice.Chambers@justice.wa.gov.au; Associate.Chief.Justice(ci)justice.wa.gov.au;Minister.Quigley@clpc.wa.gov.au; office.of.commissioner@poIice.wa.gov.au
     Cc: ‘Jerry Martin’ JerrylV@hotmail.com; rav@stonewallconstruction .com.au
     Subject: Fraud – Lawyer: Laura Michelmore ‘Rosselle Chambers’
     Importance: High

Importance: High  

Dear Governor, Chief Justice, Attorney General, Commissioner of Police.  

Tomorrow at 11:45 am, Laura Jane Michelmore will be attending a Hearing at the WA Supreme Court to act as a lawyer for Jerry Martin and Emma Martin. She will continue to commit Fraud as Laura Michelmore ‘Rossello Chambers’. (CIV 2301 of 2022) 
There Is no record of ‘Rossello Chambers’ with the WA Bar Association or ASIC (the name is still available).

Laura Jane Michelmore ‘Rossello Chambers’ has sent Invoices to the Martins amounting to over $140,000; to [Mr J] for several thousand; to me for approximately $50,000. Her ‘legal services’ fail to meet the standards set out under the Legal Profession Act 2008 or Legal Profession Uniform Law and amount to nothing other than obstructing us from having our matters heard before the Court.

She even commenced Supreme Court proceedings against Benjamin Stewart in my name, using a ‘Rossello Chambers’ Retainer Agreement for provision of legal services against a representative of Government. She now uses this invalid Agreement to pursue further financial gain from me in Magistrates Court, and we are to meet at 9:30 am on 10 July 2023.

Laura Jane Michelmore has cloned the business of Katja Jane Levy (‘Rossello Legal’) and the two seem to share a dachshund named ‘Rosie’. The Linkedin profile for Laura Jane Michelmore indicates she is a Barrister – a specialist – type Lawyer that receives instructions (legal advice) from a Solicitor. Her Office is in the building next to the Office of the State Solicitor and ‘Rossello Chambers’ appeared weeks after the Australian Labor Party won the 2017 State election. It appears she has created approximately twenty contracts since.

I have now grouped together four people with five of those contracts. Our stories include documents, photos, videos, millions in damages and a famous car covered in asbestos.

Each of us sought the services of a Lawyer after representatives of the Western Australian Government caused us significant, even deliberate, financial harm. And now this Lawyer – a representative of the Government appointed by the Supreme Court – has Inflicted further financial harm. The WA Legal Practice Board has looked the other way.

As fellow subjects of His Majesty King Charles the Third, Ruler of the Commonwealth of Australia (to whom you have sworn Oath) we look forward to your prompt restoration of law and our Human Rights.

Sincerely

Adam Brown 

On Wed, 24 May 2023, 10:18 am Legal Practice Board, enquiries@lpbwa.com wrote:

Private & Confidential

Our ref: 2023/223

24 May 2023

Adam Brown

By email: aclam@ikube.corn.au

Dear Mr Brown
Your complaint against Ms Laura Michelmore of Rossello Chambers
Background
On or around 17 October 2021, you engaged Ms Michelmore to provide legal services in relation to a dispute with Manheim Pty Ltd relating to a purchase of a vehicle at auction. Ms Michel more continued to represent you in this matter until she applied to the Supreme Court in March 2023 to be removed as solicitor.
Your complaint
To summarise the complaint, during the course of this representation, you say Ms Michel more –

1. Did not authority to represent you in a criminal matter or act against a party who was a representative of the WAState Government.
2. Did not provide you necessary documents required under the Legal Profession Uniform Law.
3. Did not provide ongoing cost updates.
4. Supplied an Affidavit to the court containing false testimony about the retainer for legal services.
5. Is seeking the payment of invoice dated Tuesday, 4 April 2023.

As a result of (1) to (4) above, you dispute the most recent invoice and all costs resulting of her actions.

I have now completed my preliminary assessment and formed the following view after reviewing the information provided by you and Ms Michelmore.

Preliminary View
The responsibilities and obligations of a legal practitioner is governed under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) (Uniform Law).
I have considered your complaint and the additional information provided within the context of Uniform Law and Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (Conduct Rules). In my view, this complaint would likely be closed pursuant to section to section s277(1} if the Uniform Law on the basis:

1. There is nothing in the Conduct Rules which prohibits a legal practitioner from representing a client in a criminal matter or against a party who is a representative for the state government. Nor am I aware that there is any special accreditation requirement for lawyers to act or represent in these kinds of matters (unlike with family law).
2. While it is not completely clear from your complaint, if you are referring documents relating to cost disclosure, Ms Michelmore appears to have satisfied this requirement by issuing the cost agreement- noting that your cost agreement commenced prior to the Uniform Law.
3. A lawyer is required to provide ongoing cost disclosure where they become aware of a substantial change to a client’s legal costs and provide this information as soon as practicable. If I accept that you were not provided cost updates, I have seen no information to suggest a substantial change to your costs from the initial estimate.

In relation to the matter of the practitioners entitlement to costs under the cost agreement and the allegations of the false testimony of the legal retainer, these matters appear to have already been considered by the court.
In addition, Ms Michelmore has said that she is not willing to waive the outstanding invoices, as advised in our telephone conversation on 8 May 2023.
Therefore, this complaint is not likely to be considered any further by our office as there does not appear to be a breach of a duty under the Conduct Rules or the expected standards of a legal practitioner.
Conclusion
This represents my view of your concerns after the preliminary assessment, and is subject to change if further evidence becomes available (for example an adverse comment or finding by the court). If there is anything further that you wish to be consider, please provide it by 31 May 2023.
Should I do not receive anything further from you by this date, the file may be closed on the basis you have accepted this assessment and do not wish to proceed further.
I thank you for bringing these issues to our attention.
Kind regards

[The original document also included an email exchange between the first defendant and Master Sanderson’s associate and is of no relevance to the present proceedings.]


Appendix 2
Subject: Report and Removal of LJ Michelmore from WA SC CIV 2301 of 2022
Dear Representatives of Governments of Australia
Please find attached a Form to remove Laura Jane Michelmore as our solicitor-on-the-record for WA SC CIV 2301 of 2022.
We hereby terminate all agreements (LJM 210006 and LJM 210008) with ‘L J Michelmore’ (ABN 90 313 020 819) as she has failed to supply us with legal services meeting the requirement of the Legal Profession Act 2008.
Further, we accuse Laura Jane Michelmore of the following Crimes – committed while acting as our Solicitor.
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA)

• Compounding or concealing offences (s.136)
• Corruption of a Witness (s.130)
• Deceiving a Witness (s.131)
• Conspiring to pervert etc. course of justice (s.135)
• Attempting to pervert etc. course of justice (s.143)
• Fraud (s.409)
  We do not want any further contact with Laura Jane Michelmore – except when providing evidence against her in Court.
  We do require documents to be provided on her behalf by other representatives of Australian Government – including:
  Legal Practice Board

1. Practicing Certificate
   LJ Michelmore ABN 90313020819
2. LPB Form 11 – Notice of a Practitioner’s Intention to Commence as a Principal of a Law Practice
3. LPB Form 7 or Form 10
4. Practice Management Course completion
5. Change of Address from Level 14 to Level 12, 197 St Georges Terrace
6. Ownership of Bank Account: BSB: [xxx xxx]; ACC [xxxxxxxx]
   ‘Rossello Chambers’
7. LPB Form 11 – Notice of a Practitioner’s Intention to Commence as a Principal of a Law Practice
8. LPB Form 7 or Form 10
9. Change of Address from Level 14 to Level 12, 197 St Georges Terrace
10. Ownership of Bank account: BSB: [xxxxx] ; Acc: [xxxxxxxx].
    ‘Rossello Legal’
11. LPB Form 11 – Notice of a Practitioner’s Intention to Commence as a Principal of a Law Practice.
    ASIC
12. Registration of ‘Rossello Chambers’.
13. Change of Address from Level 14 197 St Georges Terrace PERTH WA 6000 (LJM 210006 and LJM 210008) to Level 12, 197 St Georges Terrace PERTH WA 6000 (LJM 210015 and LJM 220017)
    WA Bar Association
14. Barrister details associated with a ‘Chambers’.
    Rossello Legal
15. Acquisition of ‘Rossello Legal’ from Katja Jane Levy (ABN 57 714 871 014) (AR WA Department of Justice)
    Insurance
16. Professional Indemnity Insurance details.
    Please join us with Adam Sydney Brown in our respective proceedings.
    We look forward to discussing the manner in which these matters will be addressed, in accordance with State, Federal and International law.
    Regards,
    Jerry Martin and Emma Martin

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

CD
Associate to the Honourable Justice Tottle

15 JANUARY 2025