THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- REBELO [2025] WASCSR 10

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JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- REBELO [2025] WASCSR 10
CORAM : FIANNACA J
HEARD : 31 MARCH 2025
DATE OF
SENTENCE : 1 APRIL 2025
PUBLISHED : 4 APRIL 2025
FILE NO/S : INS 24 of 2023
BETWEEN : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
AGAINST
ANDRE ZACHARY REBELO
Offence(s):
1 x Murder
4 x With intent to defraud, uttered a forged record
Legislation:
Criminal Code 1913 (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)
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Sentence Imposed:
Count 1, Murder: life imprisonment, to serve a minimum non-parole period of 25 years
Count 2, With intent to defraud, uttered a forged record: 4 years’ imprisonment
Count 3, With intent to defraud, uttered a forged record: 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment
Count 4, With intent to defraud, uttered a forged record: 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment
Count 6, With intent to defraud, uttered a forged record: 4 years’ imprisonment
Representation:
Counsel:
Prosecution
:
Mr B Tooker & Ms AM Tully
Accused
:
Mr A Elliott & Mr D Jones
Solicitors:
Prosecution
:
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Accused
:
Tasic Legal
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FIANNACA J:
Introduction
1
Andre Zachary Rebelo, on 5 December 2024, you were convicted in this court, after a trial by jury, of the offence of murder, namely that on 25 May 2020, at Bicton, you murdered Colleen Da Horta Rebelo.
2
Colleen Rebelo was your mother. You killed her for a financial motive. It was a premeditated offence, a monstrous act that was integral to a fraudulent scheme by which you intended to profit through life insurance policies you had taken out on your mother’s life. It was an incomprehensible betrayal of the person who had brought you into this world and nurtured you, and who was a devoted mother to her children and grandmother to her only grandchild, your son.
3
You now come to be sentenced for the offence of murder. You also come to be sentenced for four counts of uttering a forged document with intent to defraud, which relate to your fraudulent conduct after your mother’s death, when you made attempts to claim on one of the life insurance policies you had taken out in your mother’s name. Those offences were charged on the same indictment as the murder charge. They are counts 2, 3, 4 and 6 on the indictment. You pleaded guilty to those charges on the first day of your trial, which was 9 October 2024. Another count of the same offence, namely count 5, was discontinued by the State. Having entered judgments of conviction in respect of the four counts of fraudulent uttering, I adjourned sentencing for those offences until after the conclusion of the trial for the murder offence. Of course, your conduct in committing the fraudulent uttering offences was relevant to the State’s case on the charge of murder, and a significant amount of evidence was presented in relation to that conduct. That evidence is relevant in deciding the facts on which you are to be sentenced for those offences.
4
After you were convicted of the offence of murder, I adjourned sentencing until yesterday, 31 March 2025. Your counsel had indicated that he would be seeking a psychological report privately, rather than request one to be ordered by the court. However, he subsequently informed the court in writing that, after taking instructions from you, it was decided not to have you assessed by a psychologist, as it was considered that such an assessment was unlikely to provide any useful information for the sentencing process. Counsel confirmed that to be the position yesterday.
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5
The court did receive written submissions from the State and your counsel in respect of sentencing. I also received two victim impact statements, to which I will refer later. Both parties made oral submissions yesterday. They put on the record much of what is in the written submissions and elaborated on those submissions. At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday, I adjourned the matter to today for sentencing.
6
I have had regard to all of the submissions and the materials referred to in the submissions.
Statutory penalties for the offence
7
The penalty for the offence of murder is life imprisonment, which must be imposed by me unless that sentence would be clearly unjust, given the circumstances of the offence, and if I were to conclude that you are unlikely to be a threat to the safety of the community when released from imprisonment. It has been properly conceded by you, through your counsel, that it would not be clearly unjust to impose life imprisonment, and that it is indeed the only appropriate sentence in all the circumstances. That penalty reflects the value that the community, through Parliament, places on human life.
8
Section 90(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that, when a court sentences an offender to life imprisonment for the offence of murder it must either set a minimum term of at least 10 years that the offender must serve before being eligible for release on parole, or make an order that the offender must never be released. This is not a case in which it would be appropriate to order that you never be released. Therefore, it will be necessary for me to decide the minimum term you must serve before you can be considered for release on parole. That has been the primary focus of the sentencing hearing.
9
In deciding upon the appropriate minimum term, I must have regard to the circumstances of the offence, your personal circumstances and the objectives of sentencing, especially the need for punishment and general deterrence. I must also have regard to the standards of sentencing that appear from the minimum terms that have been imposed in other cases of murder, although every case is individual. Ultimately, it is a question of what justice requires you to serve as a minimum non-parole period for the offence you have committed, having regard to all the matters I have mentioned.
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10
Any offence that involves the loss of human life is serious, and the value that the community places on human life is one of the matters the court must consider in deciding the appropriate sentence. However, no sentence could ever reflect the value of the life of a person who has died, or the loss and trauma suffered by that person’s family and friends. Nor can it alleviate such suffering. Feeling sympathy for Colleen Rebelo’s loved ones is a natural and appropriate reaction. However, the court must exercise its sentencing discretion objectively, in accordance with the requirements of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) and the sentencing principles I have mentioned.
11
As for the fraudulent uttering offences, the maximum penalty for each offence is 7 years imprisonment. I am required to impose a sentence that is commensurate with the seriousness of the offences you have committed. In determining the seriousness of the offences, I must have regard to the maximum penalty for those offences, the circumstances of the offences, any aggravating factors, and any mitigating factors, which will require me to consider your personal circumstances. Aggravating factors are those that increase your culpability; in other words, they make the offending worse, and generally would result in a more severe sentence. Mitigating factors are those that decrease your culpability or otherwise reduce the extent to which you should be punished. When I refer to culpability, I am referring to your moral responsibility, as well as your legal responsibility, for your conduct. I will deal with the particulars of each of the fraudulent uttering offences in outlining the facts.
12
Ultimately, any sentence I impose for the fraudulent uttering offences will be served concurrently with the term of life imprisonment. However, it is still necessary for me to arrive at a sentence that properly reflects the seriousness of those offences.
Approach to factual findings
Legal principles
13
In deciding the circumstances of the offences on which you must be sentenced, it will be necessary for me to make some factual findings. In relation to the offence of murder, those findings must be consistent with the verdict of the jury.
14
However, the law recognises that the issues resolved by the jury’s verdict may not include some matters that may be important in assessing an offender’s degree of culpability, or moral blameworthiness.
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In relation to any facts that go beyond
the facts necessary for the jury to have found the elements of the offence of murder proved, I must not speculate about the facts that may or may not have been found by the jury. I must make my own assessment of the evidence to determine the facts upon which you are to be sentenced.
15
To the extent that any finding of fact may make your offending more serious, it is necessary for me to be satisfied of the fact beyond reasonable doubt before I could rely on it. To the extent that any fact is in dispute that might reduce the seriousness of your offending or the extent to which you should be punished, I must be satisfied of the fact on the balance of probabilities before I could rely on it. Not all facts that may be in issue will amount to aggravating or mitigating factors, but they may provide context for the offence.
16
Apart from the principles relating to aggravating and mitigating facts, there is no requirement that I must sentence you on facts that are most favourable to you. Further, it may not always be possible to resolve all factual issues that might be relevant to sentencing. That applies if the prosecution has failed to prove a fact or circumstance that is adverse to you, but an alternative fact or circumstance favourable to you has not been established on the balance of probabilities. In that situation, I may sentence you on the basis that neither of the competing possibilities is known.1
Observations about the offender’s evidence at trial
17
In deciding the factual circumstances on which you should be sentenced, I have had regard to all of the evidence that was presented at the trial.
18
You gave evidence in the trial. By its verdict, the jury rejected your evidence on the key issue, namely whether you killed your mother on 25 May 2020. In doing so, it necessarily rejected much of your evidence in relation to what you did on 25 May 2020 and your evidence in relation to the taking out of the life insurance policies and the reasons why you pursued claims on the policies after your mother’s death. For the purpose of deciding whether you were guilty of the offence charged, it was for the jury to assess your credibility and reliability as a witness. However, I had the opportunity to observe and listen to you give evidence, and for the purposes of making factual findings for
1 RMM v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 183 [198], [201], [203] and [204].
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sentencing, I have been able to make my own assessment of your
credibility as a witness.
19
The starting point is that the evidence in relation to your fraudulent conduct in the pursuit of the life insurance claims established that you are someone prepared to deceive in the most egregious ways, capable of perpetrating elaborate lies and manufacturing evidence to achieve your ends. You also lied to the police when you were interviewed by them. I am of the view that the dishonesty manifest in your fraudulent conduct and in your lies to the police requires that your evidence should be approached with caution in determining the facts for sentencing. I would not rely on your evidence unless it was supported by other credible evidence.
20
Further, apart from when you were dealing with matters that were not controversial, I formed the impression generally that you were not a credible or reliable witness, both from the content of your answers and the manner in which you gave your evidence. At times your answers were argumentative or evasive, but the most significant issue with your evidence was that it was not plausible in relation to important issues in the trial. That was particularly so in relation to your explanations for taking out the insurance policies in respect of your mother’s life and nominating yourself as the sole beneficiary where there was an option to nominate a beneficiary or beneficiaries. The same applies to your explanations for pursuing claims on the policies with indecent haste and fraudulently creating and uttering documents in that pursuit.
21
During the trial, the State identified numerous aspects of your evidence that it submitted lacked credibility. I was of the view that the State’s submissions had merit in relation to the most important matters, and, as I have already indicated, the jury’s verdict necessarily means it agreed with at least some of those submissions. A few examples serve to illustrate the point that your evidence lacked credibility.
22
You gave evidence that you applied for the life insurance policies in your mother’s name because she asked you to assist her to obtain life insurance. I reject that evidence. Having regard to the evidence concerning your mother’s academic achievements and her financial prudence, the suggestion that she would ask you to make enquiries about life insurance for her, let alone take out any such policy in her name, if indeed she wished to have life insurance, was not credible. It was notable that she previously had life insurance.
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23
Also lacking credibility were your explanations for creating new email addresses purporting to be your mother’s addresses, when in fact they were connected to you; your explanation for using your mailing address and a phone number that was the same as yours except for one digit; and your explanation for nominating yourself as beneficiary. Part of your explanation for some of these things, namely that you were completing the online forms late at night and that you were not paying sufficient attention or made mistakes because you were sleep deprived or otherwise tired, were again implausible. In essence you portrayed yourself as being repeatedly incompetent over a number of nights, which was inconsistent with the image you otherwise sought to portray of a savvy investor in crypto currency.
24
Part of the State’s case against you was your failure to respond to calls and text messages from your partner, Grace Piscopo, in which she increasingly expressed exasperation, at a time when you were at your mother’s home proximate to when she died. Your explanation that you did not respond for some time because you kept your phone on silent, and because you were occupied chatting with your mother about the garden, was not credible for the reasons advanced by the State at the trial. Similarly, it made no sense that, if you had gone to your mother’s home primarily to drop off clothes for your brother Fabian, as you claimed, you would not tell your mother that you had done so and where you had put them. That is relevant because of your subsequent text message to Fabian, in which you purported to inform him about the clothes in case your mother had not seen them. As the State submitted, the text message appears to have been calculated to suggest your mother was not home when you dropped off the clothes.
25
Finally, your explanation for your desperate attempts after your mother’s death to have AIA Insurance pay out on the policy you had obtained with RAC, and your secrecy in pursuing that claim, was that you were concerned your siblings would think your mother had committed suicide if they became aware that the policy was taken out only days before her death. That explanation was also implausible. Although suicide was something the insurance company would need to rule out, there was nothing to suggest that your mother had committed suicide or that your siblings would seriously consider that to be the case.
26
Of course, all of that must be considered now in the light of the jury’s verdict. Having found that you killed your mother, the only motive being to claim the benefits payable under the insurance policies,
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the jury necessarily rejected any suggestion that you thought your
siblings might think your mother had committed suicide.
27
That is not a comprehensive list of matters in respect of which your evidence was found wanting, but the examples suffice to underline the point I have already made, that you were not a credible witness, and I would not rely on your evidence in determining the facts for sentencing unless it is supported by other credible evidence.
Circumstances of the offending
28
With those matters in mind, I turn now to the circumstances of your offending
Background
29
As I have already said, Colleen Rebelo was your mother. At the time of her death, she was 58 years old and lived in the family home in Bicton with your younger brother, Fabian Rebelo. You have two other siblings, Julian, who is older than you, and Monique, who is your twin sister. Julian was living in Sydney, and Monique was living in Kalgoorlie. However, on 25 May 2020, Monique was staying at your mother’s home while she was in Perth to attend training to become an ambulance officer.
30
To provide context for the offences you committed, it is important to have regard to your mother’s background and her circumstances as at 25 May 2020, and your circumstances at that time.
31
Your mother had separated from your father in 2010. It had been an acrimonious separation. Your father had not been in contact with the family in the 10 years prior to 2020. He had remarried and was living his own life. Your mother had retained the family home in Bicton. She had struggled financially, but had provided for her children and had completed tertiary studies. Although, like you and your brother Fabian, she suffered from hypothyroidism, she took medication for that condition, and it was well-managed. Generally, she was in good physical health and would exercise regularly. She had previously worked in a supermarket and at a café, but she had recently obtained a professional position on a medical board, was in a positive frame of mind, and had plans for the future. She was also receiving a carer’s pension as the primary carer for Fabian, who qualified for NDIS support. Fabian also has diabetes, for which he was required to take insulin. As Fabian’s primary carer, Colleen Rebelo had an important
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role in ensuring Fabian took his medication for his hypothyroidism and
diabetes.
32
Turning to your circumstances, in May 2020, you were living in an upmarket rental property in Beaconsfield with your then-partner, Grace Piscopo, with whom you had a small child, Romeo.
33
Ms Piscopo was, and still is, a successful model and social media influencer with a large online following on YouTube and Instagram. She was the primary financial provider for the family. You assisted her in her work, but you also took on the role of performing many of the domestic duties and being the primary carer for Romeo. By virtue of your relationship to Ms Piscopo, you also had a sizeable online following, although nowhere as significant as hers.
34
You had sought to pave your own path as an influencer of sorts. In the three years prior to May 2020, you had been investing in cryptocurrency and you outwardly portrayed yourself as a successful and knowledgeable cryptocurrency trader, publishing a guide about cryptocurrency online. I am satisfied on the basis of your own evidence in cross-examination, at p 2323 of the transcript, and the evidence given by Ms Piscopo, at pp 2504 – 2505 and 2551 of the transcript, that you had been telling her for some time that you were going to make a large sum of money from trading in cryptocurrency. You were still saying that to her in early 2020. However, the truth was that you had failed to make any significant money out of your cryptocurrency investment.
35
An integral part of the social influencing was that both Ms Piscopo and you shared details of your lives online. However, what you shared were predominantly favourable aspects of your lives, portraying the image of a perfect family enjoying an affluent lifestyle in a desirable well-appointed home, with an expensive vehicle, and going on impressive holidays. It was a carefully curated image, in photographs, videos and stories produced by Ms Piscopo and you that were published on the social media platforms for all to see. It was, at the very least, an incomplete portrayal of your lives.
36
The appearance of affluence was an inaccurate portrayal. Apart from the fact that much of the lifestyle was sponsored by suppliers whose products Ms Piscopo promoted, the reality was that, in the months leading up to the offending, you and Ms Piscopo were under significant financial strain and had accumulated significant debt
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through credit cards, a personal loan, and a car loan for a Range Rover
Evoque SUV.
37
As at 20 May 2020, you owed $33,788 on a personal loan obtained through the ANZ bank. You had not made any repayments on the loan since 4 March 2019, and in December 2019 the debt was referred by ANZ to BayCorp Securities, a debt collection agency, who repeatedly attempted to make contact with you for recovery of the money that was owing. Those attempts included calls on 18 May, 20 May, 21 May and 26 May 2020, which it appears you ignored.
38
You also had a credit card debt with ANZ in the sum of $7,056.12, with an interest rate of 20.24%. You had not made any repayments on that card in the previous 12 months. That debt was also referred to a debt collecting agency.
39
Ms Piscopo also had significant debts, the largest being the sum owing on a personal loan for the vehicle you shared, a Range Rover Evoque SUV. As at June 2020, more than $65,000 was owing on that loan. The debts owed by Ms Piscopo are relevant because the financial strain was being experienced by the two of you as a family, and it was due to the accumulation of debts by both of you. The witness Darren Stammers, who is a forensic accountant with WA Police, calculated your combined debts to be over $112,000 as of 30 June 2020: see exhibit 84. Of course, that date is after you murdered your mother, but it is a reasonable reflection of your financial situation at the time you murdered her. You and Ms Piscopo had overextended yourselves financially and you were not meeting all of your financial commitments. Your situation was made worse when the COVID-19 pandemic struck in early 2020, causing uncertainty for Ms Piscopo’s social media business.
40
You were paying $880 in rent for the home in Beaconsfield. On 21 April 2020 the two of you failed to pay the rent that was due. There was another occasion after your mother’s death when you and Ms Piscopo failed to pay the rent that was due.
41
In short, you were not able to meet all of your financial commitments, and in respect of some debts, it seemed that there was little prospect you would be able to repay what was owing at all in the foreseeable future. While you gave evidence that suggested you had a cavalier attitude to unsecured debts, the potential harm that an adverse
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credit rating would cause to your reputation, in the context of the life
you portrayed on social media, must have weighed heavily on you.
42
On 28 April and 30 April 2020, you obtained an early release of funds from two superannuation accounts for a total of $8,968. On 30 April 2020, you and Ms Piscopo applied for COVID-related rent relief. It was not approved.
43
I am satisfied that it was against that background of financial strain, and in circumstances where you had led Ms Piscopo to believe that you were expecting a large windfall from your cryptocurrency investment, that you formulated a plan to take out multiple life insurance policies in your mother’s name, murder her, and then claim on those policies.
The life insurance policies
44
You began to put that plan into effect on 1 May 2020 when you created a Gmail account in your mother’s name, namely ‘colleendrebelo@gmail.com’. Although it was in your mother’s name, there is no credible evidence that your mother ever became aware of it. The only person who used that email address was you.
45
On 18 May 2020, seven days before you murdered your mother, you obtained a life insurance policy with RAC Insurance by completing an application online. You specified the life insured to be ‘Ms andre rebelo’, described in the form as a female non-smoker with a date of birth of 15 May 1962, which was your mother’s birth date. On your own evidence, your intention was to obtain insurance over your mother’s life. The error in the name appears to have been due to an automatic linking of the name of the life insured with the name of the policy owner, which you also stipulated to be ‘Ms andre rebelo’. The sum insured was $500,000. You provided a mailing address that was your home address in Beaconsfield and a contact number that was your mobile number except for a change in one digit. You provided the colleendrebelo@gmail.com email address for contact. You specified yourself as the sole beneficiary.
46
The next day, on 19 May 2020, six days before you murdered your mother, you obtained a life insurance policy with ANZ in your mother’s name, again by completing an application online. The sum insured was $250,000. The fortnightly premium to be paid was $50. You specified the policy owner to be Colleen Rebelo, specifying her date of birth.
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You provided your Beaconsfield home address as the policy owner’s
address. Again, you nominated yourself as the sole beneficiary.
47
The following day, on 20 May 2020, five days before murdering your mother, you obtained a life insurance policy with AAMI in your mother’s name for the sum of $400,000. Again, you did this by an online application. You mistakenly put the year of birth as 1996.
48
In total, you took out $1,150,000 worth of life insurance over the three separate policies.
49
At no time did your mother have knowledge of the policies that you took out on her life.
The events of 25 May 2020
50
I turn now to the events of Monday, 25 May 2020.
51
At about 10.00 am that day, Colleen Rebelo drove Fabian to work at the Fresh Provisions grocery store on Canning Highway in Bicton. The drive from the family home on Preston Point Road to Fresh Provisions was approximately two minutes each way by car. She was in a seemingly normal mood and told Fabian that she would pick him up at the end of his shift at 2.00 pm.
52
Ms Rebelo failed to return at that time, which caused Fabian to call her numerous times. She did not answer her phone. At approximately 2.13 pm, Fabian decided to walk home. He arrived home just before 2.30 pm. He used a spare key to get into the house, and heard the shower running in your mother’s ensuite bathroom. He called out to her, but there was no answer. He then went in and found Ms Rebelo deceased in the shower recess, with the water running. Ms Rebelo was naked, but she was still wearing jewellery, including her watch, and makeup. She was slumped on her knees against the wall of the shower where the shower rose was. Fabian pulled her out of the shower and called 000. He then commenced CPR on Ms Rebelo whilst he was on the line with the operator. That call was made at 2.28 pm.
53
Paramedics arrived on the scene at 2.39 pm. It was obvious to them that Ms Rebelo was deceased, so they did not make any attempt at resuscitation. Ms Rebelo was declared to be life extinct at 2.43 pm.
54
Ms Rebelo died at your hands, sometime between 10.30 am and 11.40 am. She was at home alone when you killed her.
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55
I am satisfied by the cell phone tower evidence presented at the trial in relation to your mobile telephone, and the phone call records for that phone, that you were at your mother’s home in Bicton between 10.00 am and 11.33 am. You had driven there in the white Range Rover Evoque, which was seen at the front of the house sometime between 11.00 am and 11.30 am. The person who saw the car there at that time was Ms Pearl Fleming, one of your mother’s sisters, who was driving home between shifts as a bus driver. She also lived on Preston Point Road.
56
The precise circumstances in which you came to kill your mother are not known. I am not able to determine whether you went to her home that morning with the intention of killing your mother, or whether you formed the intention once you were there, having found her home alone. However, I do not consider that it makes any difference to your culpability, because, as I have already found, the murder was premeditated. It was part of a plan to profit from your mother’s death by claiming on the life insurance policies.
57
You had indicated to Fabian earlier that you had clothes that he could have, and you would drop them off at some stage. That provided you with a reason to go to your mother’s home, a pretext for visiting.
58
However, there are a number of pieces of evidence from which I infer that you did not want Ms Piscopo or your family to know you were at your mother’s house at or about the time that she died. In relation to Ms Piscopo, there are two pieces of evidence that indicate she was not even aware that you were going to your mother’s place. That is despite her evidence that she recalled sometime after September 2020 that you told her you were going to drop some clothes off at the house for Fabian on the day your mother died, which I did not find to be reliable evidence. The first piece of evidence is the fact that Ms Piscopo tried to contact you by phone persistently while you were at your mother’s home, and became somewhat abusive in her text messages in exasperation when you were not picking up or responding by text. She did not try to contact your mother, which would have been the natural thing to do if she was aware you were going to your mother’s house, and she needed to check when you were coming home. The second piece of evidence is that, in the course of the investigation in September 2020, police installed listening devices in your home under warrant. On the night of 17 September 2020, after she had been interviewed by police, Ms Piscopo spoke with you about the interview, and in the course of that discussion she said that she had no idea what
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you were doing on 25
May 2020. Given that it was the day your mother died, one would have expected Ms Piscopo to remember in September 2020 something as significant as you going to your mother’s place that morning.
59
I am also satisfied that you deliberately withheld from the police who attended the scene, and from your family when you all gathered after your mother’s death, that you had been at the house that morning and had seen her.
60
These matters were relevant to the State’s case to prove your guilt of the offence, but they also go to the question of whether you at least had in contemplation the possibility that you would murder your mother that day, if the circumstances allowed. In the end, as I have said, whether you went there for that particular purpose, or you took the opportunity because your mother was alone and vulnerable, it remains the case that the murder was premeditated.
61
Returning to the circumstances in which you killed your mother, having parked your car at the front of the property, you went to the front door. There was evidence at the trial that your mother was conscious of safety, and Fabian used a key to unlock the front door when he arrived home later. It is likely, therefore, contrary to your claim in your evidence that the front door was not locked, that your mother let you into the house. What happened after that may never be known.
62
The cause of your mother’s death was not ascertained at the post-mortem examination and has not been ascertained since, despite extensive forensic enquiries. It was not necessary for the jury to be satisfied about a precise cause of death, provided they were satisfied that Ms Rebelo’s death was caused by the acts of another person, and that the person was you.
63
However, the forensic pathologist, Dr Junckerstorff, was not able to rule out various possibilities, including asphyxiation, whether by smothering or otherwise. His evidence was that one would not necessarily expect to see any physical injury as a result of asphyxiation. Dr Junckerstorff found petechiae in your mother’s eyelids. They can be associated with asphyxiation, but he considered them to be a non-specific finding. They could have been caused in other ways. There were injuries to Colleen Rebelo’s face that were consistent with blunt force, but at least some may have been caused by the position in which
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she was found. One that appeared to be less likely to fall into that
category was a red abrasion on the inner aspect of her left eyebrow. An injury of that kind could have been caused by the application of pressure with something like a pillow to her face. There was some bruising to her left wrist that could have been caused by someone forcefully holding her wrist.
64
None of these findings enable a positive finding to be made as to how you killed your mother. However, the only reasonable inference from all the circumstances is that you used personal violence to kill her. The toxicology results ruled out anything such as a drug overdose. Your mother’s blood was also screened for synthetic insulin, and none was found, although Dr Junckerstorff explained that, by the time the screening was done, any insulin would have degraded to the point where it would not have been detected by the ChemCentre. In any event, no needle mark was found on Colleen Rebelo’s body.
65
Some possible scenarios were put to Dr Junckerstorff during his evidence. I am satisfied from a consideration of the whole of his evidence that there were various means by which you may have killed your mother that would not necessarily leave any signs of violence, including smothering and the use of what was referred to as a ‘carotid sleeper hold’, which is a form of choking with the arm, which would render the victim unconscious and would not usually leave a mark. Such an application of force could occur from behind.
66
As I have said, it is not possible to make a positive finding as to the means you used, and certainly not beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, as I have said, the only reasonable inference is that you used personal violence. Further, given that there is no evidence of a significant struggle having taken place, I consider that the only reasonable inference is that you took your mother by surprise when you inflicted the personal violence.
67
It is not known what state of dress your mother was in when you killed her. However, I do not consider that it makes a great deal of difference. Whether you removed her clothes or not, what you did next was a gross violation of her dignity.
68
After you killed your mother, you placed her in the shower, naked, to stage a scene in which it would seem that she had died of natural causes. You then turned the water on and left it running. However, it appears you did not think to remove your mother’s jewellery or
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makeup. Further, you did not place the bathmat next to the shower,
where it might be expected if your mother had been taking a shower. While your conduct was calculated and callous, it is apparent you were not thinking with clarity.
69
Having staged the scene in the bathroom, it is not known what you did after that, except for the fact that you left the house.
70
While you were at your mother’s house committing the murder and staging the scene, Ms Piscopo had been desperately trying to get hold of you by phone. There was evidence that the two of you were expecting visitors just after lunch, and it appears she was wanting to make sure you got home on time, not knowing where you were. She made 10 calls to your phone, almost every minute from 11.10 am to 11.22 am, on some occasions leaving voice messages. The extraction report from your iPhone shows that, from 11.16.47 am Ms Piscopo started sending angry text messages interspersed with the calls. Correcting grammatical errors, they were as follows:
•
At 11:16:47, ‘Answer your fucking phone’, all in capitals.
•
At 11:16:50, ‘Where are you’, all in capitals.
•
At 11:25:23, ‘Omg I swear to God, Andre’.
•
At 11:25:32, ‘Do you not have a phone??? What is wrong with you’.
•
At 11:25:36, ‘Answer for fuck sake’.
•
At 11:25:43, ‘I’m fuming at you, I’m so angry’.
71
The phone records show that you finally answered your phone at 11:33:06 am, which was a call made by Ms Piscopo to your phone which lasted one minute and 27 seconds. It is clear from all of that evidence that Ms Piscopo had the expectation that you would ordinarily answer your phone and read your messages, irrespective of whether you put it on silent from time to time, as you claimed. The only reasonable inference is that you were not answering the calls and messages because you were murdering your mother and dealing with the aftermath. It would appear that you had finished doing those things by 11.33 am.
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72
The cell tower records for your mobile phone indicate that you then returned home. The extraction report from your iPhone shows that, at 12.38 pm, you sent a text message to your mother’s phone asking, ‘Are you free to watch Romeo today or tomorrow?’. In the context that you have been found guilty of murdering your mother, that message was clearly intended to create the impression that you believed your mother was alive at that time, to conceal what you had done and, in effect, to create a false alibi. At 2.08 pm, you sent a text message to Fabian, saying, ‘Yo there’s a bag of my old clothes in the [hallway] for you[.] [D]ropped them off this morning. [I]n case Mum didn’t see them.’ I am satisfied that this was an attempt by you to create the impression that, when you went to your mother’s home, she was not there, or at least you did not have any interaction with her, and that you were alerting Fabian because she may not have seen them since then. If your purpose in going to the home had been to drop off the clothes and your mother was there, you would have told her where you left the clothes, and the message would not have been necessary. Again, I am satisfied this was an attempt to cover your tracks in circumstances in which you were still thinking about the heinous offence you had committed. Fabian responded to your text message within seconds, texting, ‘Easy cheers’.
73
I note that from about 2.09 pm, you engaged in text message exchanges with other persons relating to meetings and content creation.
74
At some stage just before 2:44:32 pm, Fabian tried to call you after finding your mother dead. He then sent a text message at that time saying, ‘Cunt answer please[,] mum is dead’. He sent four further text messages from 2:44:43 pm to 2:48:33 pm, pleading with you to come to his place and calling you the ‘C’ word. Your brother, Julian, sent you a text at 2:57:11 pm asking you to call back, saying it was urgent. From 3:05:39 pm you received three text messages from Monique, asking if you had answered Fabian’s call and telling you, in effect, to come to your mother’s place immediately. You finally responded by text to Monique at 3:08:46 pm, saying you were coming, and that you had called Fabian already.
75
You then went with Ms Piscopo to your mother’s home, where Fabian and Monique were present. Officers from the Palmyra police station were already in attendance. They conducted an initial investigation, during which they found no sign of a forced entry and no sign of a disturbance inside the house. As there were no suspicious circumstances, the matter was subsequently forwarded to the Coronial
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Investigation Squad
. The post-mortem examination of Colleen Rebelo’s body was conducted on 28 May 2020. The pathologists were not able to identify any anatomical cause of death or any natural disease that may have resulted in her death. As I have said, subsequent forensic investigations were not able to identify a cause of death, which remains unascertained.
76
As I noted earlier, when you attended the house while the police were there, you did not disclose that you had been at the house that morning. Nor did you disclose that to Monique or Fabian. I do not accept your evidence that you may have done so. I also do not accept your explanation that there was no need to do so because of your text to Fabian about dropping off the clothes. As I said earlier, the implication from that message was that your mother had not been home, or that you did not have any interaction with her if she was home. I am satisfied that you did not tell the police, Monique or Fabian that you had been at the house late that morning because you wanted to conceal the fact that you had interacted with your mother. You wanted to conceal that fact because you feared it would implicate you in her death.
77
Your older brother, Julian, returned to Western Australia following the news of your mother’s passing. There was a family meeting. Again, you did not disclose that you had seen your mother on the morning of 25 May 2020. Again, I am satisfied that was because you wanted to conceal your connection to her death.
Offender’s actions after deceased’s death
78
I turn now to your actions after your mother’s death.
79
On 28 May 2020, three days after your mother’s death, you commenced the claims process on the life insurance policies you had taken out in respect of your mother’s life. The previous afternoon, at 4.20 pm, you had contacted the Coroner’s office requesting an update regarding your mother’s death. Later that night, at approximately 11.38 pm, you emailed RAC Insurance advising that Colleen Rebelo had passed away and that you had discovered a life insurance policy in her name.
80
On the morning of 28 May 2020, you sent an email to RAC Insurance providing the policy number and claimed it to be your mother’s life insurance policy. You provided an email address of andrerebelobiz@gmail.com. You were told that they would email a claims pack to you. Unbeknownst to you however, the person dealing
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with the claim was immediately suspicious. Shortly afterwards, you
made a call to the ANZ life insurance team, provided the policy number for the policy with that company and asked for a claim pack to be sent to you. A few hours later, you called RAC Insurance making inquiries about how to start the claims process.
81
The following day, on 29 May 2020, you continued to contact the insurance companies, to make enquiries about the three policies, including the policy with AAMI. Your pursuit of both the AAMI and ANZ policies quickly came to a dead end. In relation to the AAMI policy, the customer service officer raised concerns in relation to the policy they had, as it was for a Colleen Rebelo who was 24 years old, having a year of birth of 1996, not a Colleen Rebelo, with a date of birth of 15 May 1962. The customer service operator also provided advice that, even if this was the right policy, it had been taken out only a week earlier, and the policy needed to be in existence for 12 months before a claim could be commenced.
82
In relation to ANZ policy, you were sent the claims pack by email which you then forwarded on to Julian, and asked him to contact ANZ regarding the claim. You did so because on that policy you had not been able to nominate a beneficiary, and you knew Julian was the executor under your mother’s will. The claims pack did not have any details of the policy. Julian made some initial inquiries, but he was told he needed a policy number before he could be provided with any information. He asked you for the number, but you did not give it to him, and so the claim did not proceed. I am satisfied that you did not provide Julian with the policy number because you did not want him to become aware of the circumstances in which the policy had been taken out, that is, by you, using your contact details. It seems you had hoped that Julian would simply complete the claim form without details of how the policy was obtained.
83
In the end, the claim you were able to pursue was in relation to the RAC policy. The fact that you had used the wrong name on the policy was remedied, but there were other obstacles. The claim was handled by a company called AIA Insurance. The evidence established that you were persistent in your calls and written communications with the claims officers at AIA over a number of months, becoming more and more exasperated and desperate as it became apparent they required more information, including a cause of death. In the early stages you persistently asked whether you could receive an early payment for funeral expenses. As time progressed, you pretended that there was
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urgency in getting the matter resolved because the family were wanting
to sell the deceased’s home, which was not true. In any event, Julian dealt with issues to do with the estate, as the executor of your mother’s will.
84
One of the issues AIA Insurance needed to explore was the possibility of suicide, which would have disqualified the claim, as it was within the first twelve months of the policy. In that context, they needed information about your mother’s mental health. She had been seeing a psychologist named Narina Sidhu, so it became necessary for you to obtain a report from her to indicate that there were no concerns about your mother’s mental health that might suggest a risk of self-harm. You pursued such information from Ms Sidhu with some persistence, but she was not prepared to provide a report without an appointment to discuss the matter. You did not attend any such appointment.
85
AIA also needed a copy of any will made by your mother, so they could deal with the executor. Your mother had in fact made a will on 2 March 2010, not long after her separation from your father. She appointed Julian Rebelo to be her executor. Apart from a specific gift in respect of her jewellery, her estate was to be shared equally between the four children.
86
As with the AAMI policy, you could not have Julian become aware of the circumstances in which the policy was obtained. Importantly, you did not want it known that you were nominated as the sole beneficiary.
87
In those circumstances, you forged a will in your mother’s name that named you as the executor. You went to the extent of using the names of two lawyers as the witnesses to the will, and forged their signatures. You had found the names by research, not realising perhaps that it would have been impossible for them to have been the witnesses, because of their ages. They did not know you and were unaware of your fraudulent conduct.
88
On 10 June 2020 you uttered a forged record by sending the forged Last Will and Testament of Colleen Da Horta Rebelo to AIA Insurance in pursuit of the claim on the RAC policy. The purpose of sending the document was to enable you to deal with the insurance company as the legal representative of your late mother’s estate, in order to defraud the company of the sum insured. This is count 2 on
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the indictment, the first offence of uttering of a forged document with
intent to defraud.
89
Having failed to obtain a report from Ms Sidhu, you also forged a document entitled Medical Information Request dated 12 July 2020, purporting to be a report from Ms Sidhu about her treatment of Colleen Rebelo. This required you to research the information that should be included and involved an elaborate fabrication. On 13 July 2020 you uttered a forged record by sending that document to AIA Insurance. You did so to convince the insurance company that Ms Rebelo had not failed to disclose any relevant information about her mental health in her application for life insurance. It was intended to further your claim, in order to defraud the insurance company of the sum insured. This is count 3 on the indictment.
90
There was an issue with the first document you sent purporting to be from Ms Sidhu, in that it was not signed. You then fraudulently prepared another copy entitled Medical Information Request dated 20 July 2020 with a forged signature. On 21 July 2020 you uttered a forged record by sending that document to AIA Insurance. It purported to be a signed copy of the earlier report from Ms Sidhu. Once again, the purpose of it was to convince the insurance company that Ms Rebelo had not failed to disclose any relevant information in her application for life insurance. It was intended to support the claim in order for you to defraud the company of the sum insured. This is count 4 on the indictment.
91
AIA Insurance continued to be suspicious about the claim and the documents you had forwarded. The claims officer subsequently informed you that they would need to speak with Ms Sidhu to confirm that the report was genuine.
92
Consequently, on 27 July 2020 you called AIA Insurance and left a fake voicemail message, purporting to be from Narina Sidhu. You created this voice recording using an on-line spoofing tool. You then rang AIA Insurance and played the voice recording over the phone line. There is no charge in respect of this conduct, but it illustrates the extent of your deceit and the elaborate means you were prepared to use to bring the scheme to fruition by receiving a payout of the sum insured, namely $500,000, from the policy. Otherwise, the murder of your mother would have been to no avail. However, as elaborate as those means were, in this instance it was an amateurish effort that created a
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robotic voice that could readily be identified as fake. It did nothing to
assuage the insurance company’s suspicions.
93
Another sticking point was that the insurance company needed a cause of death to be identified. A preliminary letter from the Coroner’s office was not sufficient.
94
On 30 July 2020 you uttered a forged record by sending AIA Insurance a document entitled Coroner’s Court of Western Australia Record of Investigation into Death, dated 29 July 2020. On the face of the document, it looked like a Coroner’s finding signed by Coroner Michael Jenkin. The cause of death was given as ‘subarachnoid haemorrhage due to ruptured berry aneurysm’. The truth was that Ms Rebelo did not die of a brain aneurysm, the Coroner’s Court had not completed its investigation at that point in time, and Coroner Michael Jenkin did not sign the document. The document was created by you after research on the internet, and cutting and pasting parts of a Coroner’s findings report that was available online. It was an elaborate forgery. You sent it to the insurance company because they were not going to pay out on the claim until a cause of death had been established. It was your intention to defraud the insurance company of the sun insured, namely $500,000. This is count 6 on the indictment.
95
Of course, enquiries with the Coroner’s office readily established that the document you sent was a forgery.
96
I am satisfied that, while you were pursing the claims, you led Ms Piscopo to believe that what you were doing had to do with a return you were expecting on your cryptocurrency investment, and that it was $500,000. I am satisfied that is what Ms Piscopo was referring to in her discussion with you on the night of 17 September 2020, after her interview with the police. As I said earlier, that conversation in your home in Beaconsfield was covertly recorded by a listening device, pursuant to a warrant. The recordings were played during the trial and received as exhibit 169. The transcript was received as a jury aid as exhibit 170. Relevant parts of the conversation may be found at pages 1726 and 1730 of the prosecution brief.
97
As I noted earlier, you had been telling Ms Piscopo for some time since you made the initial cryptocurrency investment three years earlier that you were expecting to receive a substantial windfall from your investment. Some of Ms Piscopo’s evidence suggested that you had mentioned $500,000 before you murdered your mother. I do not
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consider it to matter whether or not that sum was mentioned before
25 May 2020. What matters is that what you said to Ms Piscopo after 25 May 2020, when you were pursuing the RAC claim, demonstrates that part of the motivation for carrying out the scheme, which included the murder of your mother as an integral step, was your desire to fulfil the expectation you had created in Ms Piscopo that you were a successful investor in cryptocurrency and that you would be contributing a substantial sum of money to your finances.
98
That is not to say that Ms Piscopo required that of you. Nor do I accept the argument made by the State during the trial, although not pressed in the sentencing hearing, that you acted out of feelings of inadequacy or a perception that you were subservient to Ms Piscopo in the relationship. Although Ms Piscopo may have been demanding at times, there is no evidence that you were driven by some desire to be the dominant partner in providing for the family. Nevertheless, the evidence does support the conclusion that you wanted to project the image of a successful investor, who had a particular aptitude in the field of cryptocurrency, and you did want to contribute in a significant way to the finances to overcome the financial difficulties in which you found yourselves. The persona you had created alongside Ms Piscopo was more important to you than any filial connection to your mother.
99
It seems to me that we do not know the true nature of that connection, in terms of whether your relationship with your mother was close or whether there was friction between you. There was evidence in the trial that your mother did not approve of the social media influencing work Ms Piscopo and you were pursuing. There was also some evidence that Ms Piscopo was distant from other family members. However, it is not possible for me to make any specific findings about those matters or how they might have affected your relationship with your mother. All that can be said is that we may not have the full picture in circumstances in which I am not prepared to rely on your evidence about such matters.
Police interview
100
The matter was referred by AIA to the police, who initially investigated the fraudulent conduct.
101
Your home was searched by police on 16 September 2020, while you were there with Romeo, and you were interviewed by police later that day. The interview focused mainly on the fraudulent claim pursued with AIA Insurance. You denied any knowledge of the
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insurance policies or the claims, or the fraudulent documents that you
had submitted. In doing so you lied. Those lies were relied on by the State as part of its circumstantial case against you on the murder charge. However, you were not charged with any offence at that stage.
102
The investigation subsequently proceeded as a murder investigation. You were arrested and charged with that offence on 22 November 2022, and you have remained in custody since that time.
Intention
103
Murder can be committed in circumstances involving an intention that is less than an intention to kill, or where an unlawful killing is a likely outcome of other criminal conduct.
104
However, having regard to the manner in which the State’s case was conducted and the way in which charge of murder was left to the jury as a matter of law, it was necessary in this case for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you intended to kill your mother before you could be found guilty of murder. It follows from the jury’s verdict that you are to be sentenced on the basis that you killed your mother with the intention of causing her death. That is conceded on your behalf, and it is the effect of the facts I have stated.
Aggravating factors
105
In deciding upon the appropriate minimum term, it is necessary to have regard to any aggravating factors in the case. There are a number.
106
The first aggravating factor in your case is that the deceased was your own mother. Matricide is a crime of a particularly egregious and shocking nature, given the relationship a mother ordinarily has with her children. It is a crime that right-minded people in the community would regard with horror. As I noted at the outset, murdering your mother was the ultimate betrayal of her trust and everything she had done for you from the time she gave birth to you. As Monique said in her evidence, ‘She did everything for us, and you wouldn’t even guess we were raised by just one person.’ (ts 296) The evidence at trial from her family, friends and doctor portrayed a principled and resilient person, who had always put her children’s needs above her own. She had every right to feel and be safe in your company.
107
Related to that is the fact that you killed her in her own home, again, a place where she was entitled to feel safe. It was also a
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desecration of the place where she had raised you and your siblings,
and which was regarded as the family home.
108
Thirdly, you killed your mother in circumstances in which you were aware of her difficult background and the fact that she had brought herself, through sacrifice and hard work, to a positive place in her life, with impressive academic achievements and much to look forward to. Her mental health appears to have been as good as it had been for years, and she had plans for her future, for instance to buy an apartment in Fremantle. She had been appointed to a medical board as a community representative, something of which she was rightly proud. She was only 58, so she had a reasonable expectation of continuing to live a rewarding and fulfilling life. You knew that this was what you would be destroying, yet you proceeded with callous disregard for everything you knew about your mother and her importance in the lives of others. In particular, you deprived Fabian of his primary carer. You also deprived Romeo of his grandmother, who was devoted to him.
109
The fourth factor is that your offence was premeditated and involved some planning. It was driven by a motive to acquire a large sum of money to remedy your own financial problems and put you in a position of affluence commensurate with the image you wanted to portray of your family and of your aptitude for financial investment.
110
The fifth factor is that you staged your mother in the shower to make it look like she had died of natural causes. In doing so, you stripped her of her dignity in death, in a final degrading act. It also meant that she would likely be found by Fabian, which could be expected to result in trauma to your younger brother. It was contemptible conduct.
111
The sixth aggravating factor is that you engaged in various forms of conduct after the murder calculated to conceal your offending. Such conduct includes the text messages you sent to your mother’s phone and to Fabian, to which I referred earlier. It includes the deletion of your internet search history and other data from your computer. I am satisfied that your explanations for the manner in which the history and data came to be deleted were implausible. The obvious explanation is that there was significant incriminating evidence on your computer that had to be removed. A further aspect of your conduct calculated to conceal your offending was that you lied to family members about what you had done, at the very least by omission.
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112
Finally, it is a significant aggravating factor that, after your mother’s death, you engaged in the extensive fraudulent conduct, not just confined to the fraudulent uttering offences, in your attempts to obtain payment of the sums insured by the life insurance policies. The forging of a will and the Coroner’s findings were particularly depraved aspects of that conduct. Further, the fact that you acted so swiftly showed callous disregard for the gravity of what you had done.
Victim Impact Statements
113
I now turn to another matter that is relevant in assessing the seriousness of your offence, which is the impact of your offending on the deceased’s family, who, at law, are regarded as secondary victims.
114
The loss of life as a result of a homicide offence affects the whole of society, but, of course, the persons who will feel the loss most acutely are the deceased’s loved ones. Such an offence has a ripple effect, affecting the lives of loved ones left behind, and indeed the lives of friends, colleagues and other members of the community. It can result in lasting trauma and fears. It can adversely affect people’s functioning at work and socially.
115
I have received victim impact statements from your sister Monique and from Colleen Rebelo’s sister, your aunt, Ms Leonie Randles. The impact on both of them has been profound. The types of impact I have mentioned are all evident in their statements. To summarise them cannot do them full justice, but I will endeavour to identify key points.
116
Monique begins by stating that words cannot fathom the emotional impact that the last four years have had on her. She speaks of the heartbreak of losing her mother, who she regarded as her best friend and the most important person in her life. She says her mother was also the most devoted, caring and loving person she has ever known. She says her own sense of self and what family means to her has been shattered. She continues to struggle with grief, which she feels will never be healed, and she speaks of how this affects her relationships, as she feels numb to all emotions and finds it challenging to be open and vulnerable. She says that it is too much to comprehend the true impact that this trauma has had on her, and despite her best efforts to continue through life, that she succumbs to feelings of increased anxiety, stress and depression.
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117
Monique describes Ms Rebelo as ‘the most amazing mother who deserved the world and more for what she sacrificed for her children’. She speaks of her mother’s strength and resilience, and the fact that she had just started to complete her life goals of finishing university and having a secure career. She speaks of every positive life event, such as her wedding, as being tainted, and that she must live with the pain of her own daughter never getting to meet her grandmother. Every aspect of her life has been greatly affected by the death of Ms Rebelo.
118
Your aunt, Leonie Randles, speaks of Ms Rebelo’s death leaving a devastating void in her life, and that she continues to grieve for her every day. She describes Ms Rebelo as not just a sibling, but also her confidant and closest friend who had so much love to give. She says that your actions have caused indescribable trauma, not only to her immediate family, but to the extended family as well. She says the pain and grief they all feel is immeasurable, and the emotional toll is something they will carry their whole lives.
119
These are all consequences that underscore the need for condign punishment and deterrence for the offence of murder.
Personal circumstances
120
I turn now to your personal circumstances.
Family and upbringing
121
As of today, you are 29 years of age. You were 24 at the time of the offending.
122
You were born in Perth. I have already referred to your family history in outlining the facts. Your father gave evidence at the trial. You were estranged from him until mid-2020. It appears that since then you have developed a relationship with him and his second wife at some level.
123
After your father left, your mother brought you and your siblings up as a single mum. I have spoken of the fact that she provided for you all as a devoted mother. I referred earlier to Monique’s comment that one would not have guessed that your mother had raised the children on her own. While the family’s financial situation may not always have been auspicious, there is no suggestion that any of you went without in any way that might have affected your development. In fact, it appears to me that your three siblings are all well-adjusted and successful
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individuals. The same might have been said of you, before the
offending for which I am to sentence you.
124
The point is that you had a good upbringing, and there is nothing in your background that might be regarded as mitigating.
Relationships
125
You were in a relationship with Ms Piscopo for approximately eight years. That relationship ended about six months after you were remanded in custody on 22 November 2022.
126
You have one child, Romeo, who is now six years old. I am satisfied that you cared for Romeo and were a good father to him. It is one of the terrible consequences of your offending that he will grow into adulthood only knowing his father as an inmate in prison. You have deprived him of the opportunity to have a normal relationship with his father.
Education and employment
127
Turning to your education and employment, you have said that you were held back a year in your first year of primary school as a result of your level of learning and issues to do with your hypothyroidism.
128
You attended a Catholic secondary school and completed your schooling in 2014. You subsequently studied construction management at university, completing three years of the four years of coursework. You did not complete the degree.
129
You had not been in paid employment for the three years prior to your arrest, as you were the primary carer for your son, while Ms Piscopo was the primary income earner. You would assist Ms Piscopo with business development, negotiations and promotions, content production and administrative tasks. You shared your finances. I accept that Ms Piscopo was earning about $171,000 per year at the time of the offending, but as I noted earlier, the income was variable and there was some impact from the pandemic. In any case, as I noted earlier, you both had significant debts. It is said on your behalf that Ms Piscopo was in the process of setting up other businesses that would have brought in more income, but that does not alter the difficult financial position in which you found yourselves in May 2020.
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130
You had an interest in cryptocurrency and day trading. I have referred to that in outlining the facts. Those interests did not net you any significant income that would stave off the debts. You filed for bankruptcy in 2022.
131
Since you have been in custody, you have worked as a Unit Transitional Clerk, which is a trusted position.
Alcohol and substance use
132
You have never had any issues with substance abuse.
Health
133
You have hypothyroidism, a condition for which you had been treated with medication on a long-term basis prior to your arrest
134
You have previously seen a counsellor in respect of anxiety and depression. You were prescribed an antidepressant but did not fill the prescription. It was said on your behalf that you had poor mental health prior to your arrest due to being a young parent, and the primary caregiver to your son. I do not consider that I can give that submission any weight, as it is at odds with the impression that you gave at trial. When asked about how you felt caring for your young child, you said you were ‘blessed and fortunate’ to spend time with your son, noting that it was not a luxury that working parents were afforded. You said it was something you would do ‘a thousand times over’.2
135
In any event, as you have chosen not to obtain a psychological assessment, it is difficult to make any finding about your mental health.
Character
136
You do not have any prior criminal record. However, the nature of your offending in this case is such that your prior lack of criminal history does not provide any significant mitigation. Apart from the seriousness of the murder offence and what that says about your capacity for violence, the moral corruption involved in your persistent and gross dishonesty suggests that your prior apparent good character was not an accurate indication of your character.
137
In the absence of a psychological report, I have no information that can assist me to assess your risk of future violent offending or
2 ts 2311.
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fraudulent offending
. It is a neutral factor that ultimately can have no bearing on the sentence I impose.
138
It seems to me that you will need to demonstrate by your participation in appropriate courses that you have the capacity to rehabilitate. I appreciate that you maintain your innocence in respect of the murder offence, which will make it difficult to address issues related to that offence, but there is scope apart from that to address the thinking and behaviours relevant to the fraudulent uttering offences.
Sentencing considerations
Absence of acceptance of responsibility and remorse
139
That brings me to two matters for which you do not receive mitigation. They are your lack of acceptance of responsibility for the murder offence and your lack of remorse, or your failure to demonstrate remorse.
140
Remorse can be a significant mitigating factor. Here, it is absent. Further, you do not have the benefit of mitigation that comes from an acceptance of responsibility. Even in respect of the fraudulent uttering offences, the demonstration of remorse has been limited, because you did not accept at trial that you acted of your own accord in taking out the insurance policies. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you did.
141
Your sentence is not aggravated by the fact that you were convicted after trial in respect of the murder offence, but you do not have the benefit received by offenders in other cases, where they have pleaded guilty.
General deterrence
142
As I have said, a case of this kind requires a sentence to reflect the need for general deterrence.
143
General deterrence is paramount because the act of killing another person, especially one’s mother, no matter what the circumstances, is abhorrent to the community. The court must do what it can, by the sentence that it imposes, to provide protection to members of the community by imposing condign punishment that will act as a deterrent.
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Mitigating factors
144
I turn then to the matters that have been put forward as mitigating factors. There are really only three matters, the last of which is marginal.
Pleas of guilty and co-operation in the trial process
145
The first matter is that you pleaded guilty on the first day of trial to the fraudulent uttering counts. They were very late pleas. However under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), I can reduce the sentence that I would otherwise have imposed for each of those offences, before taking into account mitigating factors, to reflect the benefits to the State, to the community and to witnesses in the trial that flow from the pleas.
146
Section 9AA provides that the maximum discount that can be given for a plea of guilty, for its benefits to the State and to witnesses, is 25%. Having regard to the lateness of the pleas and the strength of the case against you in respect of all of the charges to which you pleaded guilty, I do not consider that anywhere near the maximum penalty is justified. Evidence about the fraudulent claims, and the manner in which you went about the claims, was always going to have to be adduced as part of the State’s circumstantial case on the murder charge.
147
I have decided that an appropriate reduction of the sentence that would be appropriate before taking into account mitigating factors in respect of the fraudulent uttering offences is 10%. That might indeed be thought to be generous, but I consider that it is appropriate to encourage the entering of pleas of guilty, even if they are entered at a late stage.
148
As I said earlier, the pleas of guilty reflect a limited acceptance of responsibility. Although you have accepted fully that you uttered the documents, and indeed you have admitted that you created the false documents, and that you did so with intent to defraud the insurance company, those offences are to be considered in the context of your wider conduct, which was that it was part of a scheme to take out the life insurance policies in your mother’s name and then claim upon those policies once your mother was murdered. The fact that you had unilaterally taken out the insurance policies is an important aspect of the fraudulent conduct, that is, uttering forged documents for the purpose of defrauding the insurance company.
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Cooperation and efficient running of the trial
149
The second matter, which relates to the murder offence is that, through your lawyers, you made admissions and concessions that contributed to the efficient running of the trial. That is accepted by the State.
150
For example, you signed formal admissions under section 32 of the Evidence Act 1906 in relation to a number of facts, you agreed to the tender of a table of communications, you allowed the State to read in non-contentious witness statements and, so far as the evidence in relation to the fraudulent uttering offences was concerned, that was able to be adduced in a way that did not require witnesses to be called who may have been able to give direct evidence about certain things you did. The evidence was able to be given by other witnesses. For instance, in relation to the insurance claims, the claims officer who gave evidence was allowed to give evidence of what the record showed about what you had said to other people.
151
This resulted in substantial savings in the time taken to complete the trial and in the resources that were necessary to conduct the trial. You do deserve credit in relation to that, and it will be reflected as a reduction of the sentence that I would otherwise have imposed as the minimum term for the offence of murder. Such cooperation is to be encouraged, and it would not be fair for the court to disregard the cooperation in determining the appropriate minimum term.
Youth
152
The last matter that I have been asked to take into account as a mitigating factor, and which I consider may amount to a mitigating factor, is that, at the time of the offending, you were 24 years of age. Courts have considered that persons who are in their early 20s, perhaps even as old as mid-20s, may be regarded as being youthful in a way that may be mitigating. There are generally three ways in which youth can mitigate the punishment that is imposed on an offender.
153
The first relates to the actual offending itself. People who are young may be immature and may have not yet formed the capacity for good judgment. That lack of capacity for good judgment may be taken into account in determining the extent of moral culpability of the individual. The second way in which youth may be relevant is that imprisonment, where that is the punishment that is imposed, may be regarded as being more onerous for a person who is young, particularly
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if
they are serving a term of imprisonment for the first time. The third way in which youth has been regarded as relevant in the past is that a youthful person may have better prospects of rehabilitation than someone who is older and may be entrenched their ways.
154
In this case, it is difficult to assess what I should make of the question of your maturity or immaturity. Clearly, anyone who behaves in the way that you did, both in formulating the plan that you did, killing your mother and then making false insurance claims, is not exercising good judgment. That does not mean that it is because of their youth. At the age of 24, it seems to me that you were on the cusp of the age range that may be regarded as providing mitigation in that regard, but I will take it into account as a mitigating factor in a very limited way.
155
Similarly, insofar as the impact of imprisonment is concerned, it might be accepted, that at your age, and given that you have not previously been to prison, the impact of imprisonment upon you may be regarded as being more onerous than otherwise would be the case. So, again, I will allow limited mitigation for that in the sentence that I impose upon you.
156
Finally in relation to rehabilitation, it is difficult for me to make any assessment in that regard because of the fact that you’ve not accepted responsibility. Even in relation to the fraudulent offences, I cannot say that your age will have any bearing upon whether you are a good prospect of rehabilitating or not. I do not give any weight to that aspect of youth as a mitigating factor.
Acting out of desperation
157
It was put on your behalf that another mitigating factor may be that you acted out of desperation in pursuing the claims on the insurance company. Your counsel accepted that this does not excuse your conduct, but he suggested that it was open for me to conclude that your thinking was clouded by the desperation associated with your unhealthy financial situation. I am not able to accept that submission. Your financial situation was certainly a difficult one, but there is nothing about your actions that suggests that your thinking was clouded by desperation.
Comparable cases: Murder
158
I turn finally to the question of the customary standards of sentencing for the offence of murder in respect of the minimum term.
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159
There is no range of sentences that the court can look to in order to determine where your offence falls, and to then attach a particular figure as the appropriate sentence reflecting the criminality of your conduct based on a scale. That is because offences of murder can be committed in many different ways in different circumstances, even when it comes to offences involving the death of a parent or parents at the hands of a child. Further, the circumstances of offenders will vary greatly.
160
Your counsel referred to Corbett v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 97 as providing general guidance in that regard. I accept that what was said by Mitchell JA in that case, agreed to by the other justices of the court, does reflect the range of sentences that have been imposed for offences of murder where there is only one deceased. As the court said at par 101:
It is not uncommon for minimum terms in the range of 17 to 23 years to be imposed for single offences of murder including in cases where there has been a plea of guilty and/or an absence of any intention to kill. The appropriate sentence in any particular case will depend on a careful and detailed consideration of all the circumstances of the offence and offender and all applicable sentencing principles.
161
It is noteworthy that the court recognised that sentences even as high as 23 years as a minimum term may be imposed where a person has pleaded guilty. Of course, that is not your situation.
162
Further, it has to be recognised, as the Court of Appeal has on numerous occasions, that when an appeal is made from a sentence imposed by a sentencing judge and the sentence is upheld, that does not set an upper limit of what might be the appropriate sentence in that case. Ultimately, the court in each particular case must have regard to all of the circumstances, as was stated in Corbett, in determining what justice requires the offender to serve as a minimum non-parole period.
163
The State referred to three cases that it submitted might be regarded as comparable, only in the sense that they involved the killing of a parent or a grandparent. They were Mack v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 207, Sturniolo v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 147, and The State of Western Australia v Silich [2011] WASCA 135. There was discussion in respect of all of those cases during the sentencing hearing yesterday. I do not intend to traverse the facts of those cases or the submissions that were made in respect of them. I have taken the facts of those cases, what was said by
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the Court of Appeal in each of t
hem and the submissions that were made in respect of them yesterday by counsel into account.
164
It was suggested that Mack was perhaps closest to the circumstances of your case because, in that case, the offender was found to have killed his mother in order that he could then profit financially. Having killed his mother, he then drew down on the very significant funds that she had in the bank and also inherited other properties. The offender in that case had autism. Although it was not considered to be causally related to his offending, it was nevertheless part of his personal circumstances taken into account in sentencing. The minimum term imposed in that case was 20 years.
165
I have had regard to the sentence imposed in Sturniolo, which was a sentence that I imposed and was upheld on appeal. In my view the circumstances of your offending are significantly more serious than the circumstances in Sturniolo. There was no suggestion in that case of any motive to gain financially. In that case, the offender killed her grandmother in circumstances where she disliked her grandmother, because she felt her grandmother had caused grief in her mother’s life. None of that excused her conduct, but that was the context of her offending. It involved what was, in effect, poisoning by the administration of medication that was not the victim’s medication over a period of time. Although your offending was not committed over a period of time, in the sense of the acts that resulted in the death of your mother, in my view the circumstances of your offending are significantly more serious, involving the infliction of personal violence, as I have found, and for a motive that involved the potential gain of a very substantial sum of money through life insurance policies that you had taken out in your mother’s name. In Sturniolo, the minimum term, again, was 20 years.
166
Silich was a very different kind of case, where the accused was in a methylamphetamine-induced psychosis and killed both of his parents. I do not consider that I can draw any assistance from the circumstances of that case.
167
Having indicated the view that I have of the circumstances of your case compared to the cases of Mack and Sturniolo, it is then a matter for me to determine where I consider your offending sits, in terms of a more serious case that is deserving of a greater minimum term.
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Determination of sentence
Minimum term
168
The minimum term that I impose ultimately will be the period that you must serve in relation to the offence of murder after I impose a term of life imprisonment, which as I have said is the only appropriate sentence in this case. It does not mean that you will necessarily be released at the end of the minimum term, but it gives you the opportunity to mitigate the punishment that I am going to impose of life imprisonment by serving part of your sentence in the community in due course towards your rehabilitation. Whether or not you are released at the conclusion of the minimum non-parole period will be a matter for the parole authorities at that stage.
169
In determining the appropriate minimum term in your case, I am of the view that your offending falls at the higher end of murder offences committed against a single deceased. The sentence that I am going to impose in relation to the offence of murder reflects that, and it reflects the limited mitigating factors that I have acknowledged should be given some weight in your case. Perhaps the most significant mitigating factor, which I spoke about earlier, is the facilitation of justice through the admissions and cooperation during the course of the trial.
The fraudulent uttering offences
170
In relation to the fraudulent uttering offences, I am of the view that count 6 is towards the very upper end of the range for offences of uttering forged documents with intent to defraud. The fabrication of a document purporting to be a court document, the finding of a coroner, including the forging of a signature purporting to be the signature of the coroner and using it for the purpose of significant financial gain, is offending of the most egregious kind. It has the capacity to undermine the integrity of the justice system.
171
I am of the view that count 2, which is the uttering of the forged will, is of similar seriousness. Again, it goes to the integrity of the system of justice that we have, our system of law, by which the community expects to be able to identify the last intentions of a deceased person and to give effect to those intentions. In my view, your conduct in preparing those documents and then uttering them in order to defraud the insurance company is deserving of a sentence towards the upper end of the appropriate range. I accept the concession made by the State that it is not conduct that could be regarded as being
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in the worst category, which would have then justified the maximum
sentence available under statute, but that is largely because of the fact that you come to be sentenced as someone who has not committed any offending of this kind in the past.
172
So far as the other two offences are concerned, that is count 3 and count 4, they are not as serious, but they are still very serious offences of their kind. Impersonating a psychologist, providing information that purports to be confidential medical information, is not only detrimental to the way in which an insurance company may conduct its business, but it also had the potential to affect the reputation of an experienced psychologist in Ms Sidhu. While the sentences that I intend to impose for those offences are less than for counts 2 and 6, they will still be significant terms.
173
The sentences that I do impose in relation to the fraudulent uttering offences will be reduced to reflect the discount under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act for your pleas of guilty, and the very limited mitigation that is attributable to the fact that you had not previously offended, and the limited mitigation as I have explained in relation to your age.
174
It may have been appropriate to accumulate the sentences for at least two of the offences of uttering a forged document, potentially in respect of count 2 and count 6, because each was a very egregious example of its kind, even though you will be required to serve the sentences that are imposed for those offences concurrently with the term of life imprisonment that I impose for the murder. However, even if I had been sentencing you for only those offences, I would have considered that the totality principle would justify ordering that the sentences be served concurrently. It seems to me that, ultimately, the sentence that I impose for counts 2 and 6 will adequately reflect the whole of your offending.
Commencement of sentence
175
You have been in custody in respect of the offences of which you have been convicted since you were arrested on 22 November 2022. I may take that time into account in determining the appropriate sentence. It is appropriate that I do so in this case by ordering that your sentence be taken to have commenced on 22 November 2022. In other words, the sentence I impose will be backdated to commence on that date, so the time you have spent in custody will count as time serving that sentence.
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Sentence imposed
176
Having taken into account all of the matters to which I have referred:
(1) For the offence of murder, I sentence you to a term of life imprisonment.
(2) I order that you must serve a minimum non-parole period of 25 years.
(3) In relation to count 2, the offence of uttering a forged record, namely a document entitled Last Will and Testament of Colleen Da Horta Rebelo, I sentence you to 4 years’ imprisonment.
(4) In relation to count 3, the offence of uttering a forged record, namely a document entitled Medical Information Request dated 12 July 2020, I sentence you to 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.
(5) In relation to count 4, the offence of uttering a forged record, namely a document entitled Medical Information Request dated 20 July 2020, I sentence you to 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.
(6) In relation to count 6, the offence of uttering a forged record, namely a document titled Coroner’s Court of Western Australia Record of Investigation into Death dated 29 July 2020, I sentence you to 4 years’ imprisonment.
(7) The sentences for counts 2, 3, 4 and 6 are to be served concurrently with the sentence for count 1.
(8) I order that you be eligible for parole in respect of counts 2 to 4 and 6.
177
The sentences will be taken to have commenced on 22 November 2022.
178
The effect of the sentence is that you must serve at least 25 years’ imprisonment starting on 22 November 2022 before you can be considered for release on parole.